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RESUMO 
 
Este relatório descreve algum do trabalho realizado ao longo do estágio 
curricular do Mestrado em Engenharia Geográfica, na empresa Satellite Applications 
Catapult, no Reino Unido, ao abrigo do programa Erasmus Estágio, pelo aluno 
Bento Miguel Ribeiro Martins. O estágio teve uma duração de 6 meses, tendo-se 
iniciado a 10 de Fevereiro de 2014 e terminado a 8 de Agosto de 2014, orientado 
pela Professora Dr. Luísa Bastos (Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade do Porto) 
e coordenado pelo Dr. Chaz Dixon (Satellite Applications Catapult).  
O trabalho desenvolvido ao longo do estágio focou-se na radio-interferência e 
nos seus impactos nos sistemas globais de navegação e localização por satélite, 
designada por jamming. O apoio a outros projetos foi uma constante ao longo de 
todo o semestre e desse modo serão também adicionadas componentes de 
interesse que complementem este tópico.  
Uma breve introdução aos sistemas de navegação (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo e 
BeiDou) irá permitir ter uma visão atual da componente espacial dos SGLNS, e em 
que aplicações estes são utilizados. As vulnerabilidades irão ser apresentadas, tanto 
quanto à sua regularidade como às suas consequências, salientando especialmente 
o papel nefasto que a interferência deliberada pode ter num recetor SGLNS, 
confirmando esta realidade através de testes realizados em laboratório. Por último, 
serão referenciadas tecnologias que poderão ultrapassar algumas destas 
vulnerabilidades, tornando os SGLNS mais robustos, seguros e viáveis.  
 
Palavras-chave: SGLNS, GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, BeiDou, jamming, jammer, 
PPD, spoofing. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This report describes some of the work done during the curricular internship of 
the Geographic Engineer Master Degree, in the company Satellite Applications 
Catapult, in the United Kingdom, under the Erasmus Internship program, done by the 
student Bento Miguel Ribeiro Martins. This placement lasted 6 months, starting on 
the 10th of February of 2014 and finishing on the 8th of August of 2014, oriented by 
the teacher Dr. Luísa Bastos (Faculty of Sciences of the University of Porto) and 
coordinated by Dr. Chaz Dixon (Satellite Applications Catapult). 
The work developed during the internship focused on radio-interference that 
disturbs the global navigation satellite systems, named jamming. The support on 
other projects was a constant during all the semester, so will be added some 
interesting components that will complement this topic. 
A brief introduction to navigation systems (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo and 
BeiDou) will permit to have an actual vision of the spatial segment of the GNSS and 
in which applications they are used. The vulnerabilities will be presented, regarding 
their regularity and consequences, emphasizing the disastrous role that deliberate 
interference has in a GNSS receiver, confirming this reality through trials made in 
laboratory. At last, will be referenced technologies that can overtake some of these 
vulnerabilities, making the GNSS more robust, safe and viable. 
 
Keywords: GNSS, GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, BeiDou, jamming, jammer, PPD, 
spoofing. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are one of the biggest inventions 
of the XX century, matching a broad number of technologies to give three modest 
pieces of information: position, velocity and timing (PVT). It may look simple but all 
the research behind, all the billions of money to put the system running is far behind 
people’s common knowledge. Even the term people use is incorrect, and everything 
is called GPS (Global Positioning System, USA GNSS), when it’s just a small part of 
this GNSS world. 
GPS deserves all the credit for being the first fully functional system, though 
GLONASS (Russian GNSS) is now at his full strength, Galileo is coming with new 
services and better accuracies and BeiDou is getting stronger. But what does this 
development represent to the user? Better positioning, that’s certain, and probably 
they will still call it GPS to everything related, even when the position derives from 
more than three constellations all combined, in a gigantic bird cage. As people can’t 
see the satellites and their failures, the system seems smooth, always working, and 
always there for everyone, and if something were to happen they won’t probably 
relate it to the system, but to the receiver or smartphone they are using. The 
disinformation of the people is tolerated, though the blindness when using it can be 
quite serious, depending on the application.  
GNSS applications serve a vast number of areas, from transport to sports, from 
finance to scientific purposes. The system has a full range of vulnerabilities that can 
affect its performance, though most of them have only occurred one or two times 
since the system started operating. However, a new threat, deliberate interference, is 
getting in the way and users are not prepared for it. For example, a powerful jammer 
placed on central London can cause the chaos and have serious impact on the city’s 
basic services, like transport systems, emergency services, late deliveries and traffic 
congestions.  
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Figure 1 - Simulation of a 3 W jammer impact on London area (Source: University of Bath). 
 
Even though a scenario like this has never happened, we shouldn’t exclude its 
possibility. Is then necessary to understand the applications where GNSS sits, the 
vulnerabilities of the system and the way forward in case of failure. It is also 
necessary to study how jamming works and how it can impact a receiver and this 
report will state some conclusions on how it does. 
 
1.1. OBJECTIVES 
 
This report provides a summary of what was achieved during the internship on 
Satellite Applications Catapult (SAC), focused on GNSS capabilities, vulnerabilities 
and robustness. 
The knowledge was acquired by practical experience, managing a PNT 
(Positioning, Navigation and Timing) laboratory, learning how to handle receivers, 
from low-end to survey grade ones, a state-of-the-art GNSS simulator, RF record & 
playback devices and the respective RF cross-connections. Moreover, it was a great 
opportunity to communicate with experienced people on this field, exchanging points-
of-view, performing brain storming and attending business meetings, improving the 
20   FCUP 
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theoretical information around GNSS. Some of the themes discussed sparked an 
interest to know even more and research some particular topics. Work was 
performed in an environment of relative independence, improving responsibility and 
autonomy, providing a ‘learn by doing’ opportunity. Working on a multi-team 
company also enhanced the interest in other areas (telecommunications, space 
technology, earth observation) and provided areas of overlap and cross-support, as 
in the provision of GNSS in-lab capabilities to test other equipment that also use that 
technology. 
This report is then a gathering of some interesting topics around the GNSS 
world, learnt by direct experience, shared information and research. It’s certainly a 
hard task to do an internship report when so many tasks were performed, for 
different projects and various objectives. Though, it focuses one of the biggest 
problems: deliberate interference to GNSS signals, which it is a relative unknown 
issue for the common user, especially in Portugal (PT). 
It was a sui generis internship, not developing a full-time project, but aiding 
anything when needed, which gave a wide point-of-view to other areas, which 
wouldn’t be possible if it was only focused in one topic. Since this report is part of a 
Master Degree on Geographic Engineer, all the research analyses will be focused in 
terms of geographic positioning output from receivers, rather than the electronic 
behaviour of the equipment. 
 
1.2. STRUCTURE 
 
This report is divided in 7 chapters, finishing with a conclusion, contribution of 
the internship to the company and future work. 
In chapter I a brief introduction to GNSS, its mass use and the objectives and 
structure of this report are shown. 
In chapter II there is a presentation about the GNSS used during the internship 
(GPS, GLONASS, Galileo and BeiDou), their history, signals and especially orbits, 
using some imagery created using specific software.  
In chapter III there is a list of some of the GNSS applications used nowadays. 
In chapter IV GNSS vulnerabilities are presented, classified by type of origin.  
In chapter V the work developed in the internship will be presented, like some 
Galileo relevant work and experiments regarding the impact of jamming and 
FCUP 
GNSS Vulnerabilities & Robustness  
21 
 
 
spoofing, explaining the methodology adopted to create these trials and the 
respective results are documented. 
In the chapter VI there is a list of proposed solutions that can be adopted to 
overtake GNSS vulnerabilities or enhance the services provided. 
In the conclusion it is stated the results and outcomes of this internship, 
showing the most relevant knowledge obtained from it, followed by a small report 
about the contribution of the work to SAC and the bibliography.  
In the annexes section the company where the internship was held will be 
presented (annexe 1) showing also some of the tasks performed (annexe 2), 
followed by an explanation of all the Galileo related work made (annexe 3) and 
respective results (annexe 4 and 5). Finally a project planning is attached to show 
how the work was intended to be executed. (annexe 6).   
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2. GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS 
 
2.1. GPS 
 
2.1.1. HISTORY 
 
Global Positioning System is undoubtedly the most successful GNSS; its 
history is connected to the first satellite, Sputnik. When the Soviet Union launched 
Sputnik, a group of American physicists started to analyse the radio transmissions of 
the satellite. After a few hours, they managed to estimate the satellite position 
analysing the Doppler shift of the transmitted signal. This principle was the first step 
that led to the first navigation satellite system: Transit. 
Successfully tested in 1960, Transit could give a position fix every hour, a great 
achievement, indeed, though it was not enough for United States Department of 
Defence. A new solution was required, with more coverage and with more accuracy, 
but the cost was too high to justify the demands. A few years later the perfect 
motivation was found: the Cold War arms race. Nuclear threats level was bigger than 
ever and for that reason USA (United States of America) wanted to be prepared, and 
be in front, of whatever may came. Consequently, United States military forces 
should have a system that could provide precise positions in order to use missiles 
more effectively.  
In 1973, at the Pentagon, several military officers discussed the need for a 
Defence Navigation Satellite System and few months later the Department of 
Defence named the project as Navstar, Navigation System Using Time and Ranging, 
later Navstar-GPS, shortened to only GPS, Global Positioning System. In the 
following years the system was developed, tested and during the period 1978-1985 
ten system validation satellites were launched.  
In 1983 a plane crash where 269 people died, thus President Ronald Reagan 
issued a directive to make GPS freely available to all once it was in a mature state of 
development to avoid future accidents and improve aerial transport security. In 
December 1993, Initial Operation Capability was declared, with 24 operational 
satellites in orbit and achieving Full Operation Capability (FOC) in June 1995. 24 
satellites compose the GPS constellation, though 32 satellites are currently in orbit 
and active. 
FCUP 
GNSS Vulnerabilities & Robustness  
25 
 
 
Initially built for military purposes, GPS soon started to be a must-have in a lot 
of applications, although the highest quality signal was still reserved only to the 
military applications. Quality for civilian uses was intentionally degraded, in a process 
called Selective Availability. Depending on the purpose it would still be better than 
most other navigation systems available at the time, but for more demanding 
applications it was useless. However, in the 1st of May of 2000, there was a decision 
to shut down the SA and it was the start of the massive expansion of the GPS, 
reaching new areas of science, improving transports and even changing the way 
people do sports, etc. (Sullivan, 2014) 
 
2.1.2. SIGNALS 
 
GPS L1 band, at 1575.42 MHz, is the most important band for navigation 
purposes, and all GPS receivers use at least this band for PVT. In this band is 
modulated the Coarse/Acquisition (C/A) code, GPS’s most famous open service. In 
this frequency also exists the P Code, a precision military code which is being 
replaced by the M Code, a new modernized military signal. The access to this 
military signals is restricted to users authorized by the US Department of Defence. 
Future satellites (currently planned to start in 2016) will also emit L1C, a new open 
code, more modernized than C/A, and interoperable with other international GNSS. 
GPS L1 uses CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) protocol where every satellite 
emits a different code at the same frequency and it’s that code that identifies the 
satellite. 
GPS L2 is transmitted at 1227.60 MHz, initially built for military applications 
only, modulating the P code and the M code. Newer satellites (the first L2C capable 
satellite was launched in 2005, and currently 14 on orbit satellites are L2C capable) 
also emit a L2C code, a new open service to enhance the accuracy of GPS 
receivers. Combining L1 and L2 open signals will boost accuracy, by enabling the 
removal of ionospheric errors. L2C signal is also broadcasted at higher powers than 
L1 C/A, making it easier to track under trees or in some cases even indoor. 
To finish, a new frequency L5 at 1176.45 MHz is made available as the new 
generation satellites are put in orbit (the first L5 capable satellite was launched in 
2010, and currently 7 on orbit satellites are L5 capable). This way, GPS will provide 
open signals in three different frequencies, delivering a high robust service. L5 
frequency band was implemented mainly for aviation safety services, but it is 
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foreseen that many applications will make use and benefit from the new signal. 
(Gps.gov, 2014)(Kaplan, 2006) 
 
2.1.3. ORBITS 
 
AGI Systems Tool Kit (http://www.agi.com/products/stk/) provides visualization 
capabilities to satellite orbits in a 3D, and 2D, environment. Adding the desired 
constellations or satellites it is possible to test the coverage of a broadcasted signal, 
the ground track, etc. In the following figure it is possible to see the orbit of a GPS 
satellite, with a repetition cycle of 24 hours, 1 day. The white track represents when 
the satellite is visible from the SAC premises. The GPS satellite orbit is just under 12 
hours long; two complete orbits bring the satellite back to the same point (repeating 
ground track). 
 
 
Figure 2 - GPS satellite groundtrack 
 
In the next figure it is possible to see the six orbital planes where the 32 GPS 
satellites are placed. The white lines represent the visibility from the SAC premises. 
They have a semi-major axis of around 26560 Km and an inclination of 55º, 
considered a Medium-Earh Orbit (MEO). (Springer, 2014) 
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Figure 3 - GPS constellation 
 
The next figure shows a satellite in orbit facing earth. The satellite displayed 
is a 3D model of an actual GPS satellite. 
 
 
Figure 4 - GPS satellite view 
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2.2. GLONASS 
 
2.2.1. HISTORY 
 
During the Cold War, USSR was on top of space exploration and with the 
launch of Sputnik they proved their value, though it was not enough and they needed 
to overtake USA’s new technologies. It’s in this context that GLObal'naya 
NAvigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema, GLONASS, is proposed: a GNSS built, 
developed and managed by Russia (former USSR).  
GLONASS beginnings are somehow similar to GPS, built for military purposes, 
based on former experimental GNSS that didn’t meet the requirements to ballistic 
systems. The system was conceived in the late 1960s, but only in 1976 the 
government decided to develop it. The first launch happened in 1982 and until the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, they’ve sent to space more than 40 
GLONASS related satellites. Despite the dissolution, the program continued and 
reached full operational capability in 1995, with 24 satellites in orbit. By that time, the 
lifespan of the satellites was 3 years, so there was a constant need to replace them. 
Unfortunately, Russia suffered from a serious economic crisis in the following years, 
and the program was slightly abandoned due to lack of funding to support the need 
of launching ~8 satellites per year, making GPS more visible and trustworthy. 
Fortunately, a turnover happened in 2000, President Vladimir Putin recognized the 
importance and criticality of the GLONASS program and gave it a top priority. In 
2001, this GNSS reached its lowest point with only 6 satellites in orbit and actions 
were taken: the funding was doubled and launches of new satellites restarted a few 
years later, with new, better and higher longevity technologies (almost the twice of 
the originals lifetime). GLONASS nominal constellation consists in 24 satellites but 
currently 28 satellites are in orbit and active. 
Like GPS, military applications were top priority though President Putin 
demanded that the system should be available to everyone. In the 18th of May of 
2007, all restrictions were removed and the military signal has been freely available 
to everyone since then.  
Due to its ups and downs, GLONASS’ reputation was clearly less than GPS 
and the number of users was lower than expected. To avoid this, and because 
Russia Federation has a huge economic market, Russia threatened to raise import 
duties to every GPS-enabled equipment, unless it was also GLONASS enabled. 
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Consequently top brands started adding GLONASS support and nowadays 
smartphones and other navigation tools also support the Russian system. (Glonass-
iac.ru, 2014) 
 
2.2.2. SIGNALS 
 
GLONASS main signal is broadcasted through a process called FDMA 
(Frequency Division Multiple Access). It’s also called L1, though it doesn’t match with 
the GPS L1, and ranges from 1592.9525 MHz to 1610.485 MHz, centered at 1602.00 
MHz. In a FDMA type of transmission every satellite emits the same code in its own 
frequency, and it’s the frequency that identifies the satellite. On GLONASS L1, C/A 
code and a P code are modulated. 
In the L2 band, the same codes are transmitted, but from 1242.9375 MHz to 
1248.625 MHz, centered at 1246.00 MHz. A new band, L3, is planned to be 
introduced but is not fully guaranteed. The new generation of GLONASS will emit L1 
and L2 using the FDMA protocol, but also L1, L2, and maybe L3, in CDMA. (staff, G. 
and staff, G., 2014)(Ashjaee, J., 2011)(Navipedia.net, 2014) 
 
2.2.3. ORBITS 
 
GLONASS satellites have an orbit period of 11 hours and 15 minutes, having a 
ground-track repetition cycle of 8 days, presenting a ground path similar to the shown 
in the following figure.  
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Figure 5 - GLONASS satellite groundtrack 
 
The 28 satellites of the constellation are spread in three different orbit planes, 
enabling that in every moment more than 6 are visible in every point of the earth. By 
design GLONASS gives better coverage than GPS to high latitudes, to better serve 
the higher latitude where Russian territory is, since the orbits have 65º of inclination, 
having a semi-major axis of 25440 Km on a MEO orbit. (Springer, 2014) 
 
 
Figure 6 - GLONASS constellation 
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In the next figure is possible to see a GLONASS satellite model facing Earth on 
its orbit. 
 
 
Figure 7 - GLONASS satellite view 
 
 
2.3. GALILEO 
 
2.3.1. HISTORY 
 
Galileo system is quite new compared to GPS and GLONASS, but its ups and 
downs are a huge concern in its hope to be a state-of-the art GNSS and its validation 
as a useful European tool is being delayed by political and technical challenges year 
after year. 
Galileo’s first steps happened in 1999, when a group of engineers from four 
different countries (United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy) gathered, discussed 
and came up with an idea for a European GNSS. Four years later, Galileo 
programme was officially agreed by the European Union and the European Space 
Agency. 
Unlike GLONASS or GPS, Galileo is meant exclusively for civilian applications. 
This feature is quite remarkable since it’s not dependent on military interests which 
could be concerned on turning off or degrading the signal in case of external 
conflicts. Therefore, positioning, navigation and timing using Galileo is going to be 
permanently available and reliable to anyone. It was also planned that satellites 
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would be equipped with the latest rubidium atomic clocks and passive hydrogen 
masers, assuring great timing precisions and consequently meter and sub-meter 
positioning accuracies using a standalone receiver, better than its GNSS rivals. USA 
and European Union also signed an agreement assuring the compatibility between 
their respective systems, improving PVT quality for the end-user. 
In December 2005, GIOVE-A (Galileo In-Orbit Validation Element), the first test 
satellite was launched, followed by a second one, GIOVE-B, three years later. Signal 
testing and tracking was performed successfully, so Galileo entered in an In-Orbit 
Validation stage with the launch of two satellites in October 2011 and other two, one 
year later. With four satellites on space it was possible to get a Galileo-only position 
fix, which was achieved on the 12 of March of 2013. Although this launches have 
happened, most of them suffered from several postpones. Initially planned to have 
27 satellites (plus 3 spare ones) launched between 2011 and 2014, Galileo suffered 
from serious concerns due to lack of funding and bad critics around this billionaire 
project. Then, when everything seemed to be in the right path another great step 
back happened. On August 2014 two satellites that were going to start the Full 
Operational Capability development stage were launched, but unfortunately they 
were placed in the wrong orbit, making them somewhat useless. (Navipedia.net, 
2014)(Selding, 2014) 
The importance of a European GNSS is questionable, some critics argue that 
is not worthy to invest so much when there is a fully functional GPS and even 
GLONASS, but for EU is a way to assure its independence, economic and scientific 
power and, undoubtedly, the end-user, European or not, will benefit a lot of this state-
of-the art GNSS. (Navipedia.net, 2014) 
 
2.3.2. SIGNALS 
 
Galileo uses CDMA and will transmit signals in 3 bands: 
Its main band is called E1, although it’s collocated with GPS L1, 1575.42 MHz. 
This frequency transmits Galileo’s Open Service (OS) code, Galileo’s Commercial 
Service (CS) and Galileo’s Public Regulated Service (PRS) code.  
Galileo also transmits in the E5 band (1191.795 MHz), which can be further 
decomposed, for tracking and processing, in the E5A (1176.45 MHz) and E5B bands 
(1278.75 MHz) This band will be used for both the OS and Galileo’s Search And 
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Rescue (SAR) service, that will enable the transmission of emergency messages to 
beacons in distress, supporting the International Cospas-Sarsat Programme. 
Finally, in the E6 band, 1278.75 MHz, Galileo broadcasts CS and PRS signals. 
Agreements between the European Union and the United States of America 
were made in order to make the signals from Galileo and GPS compatible, enabling 
higher precisions, and preventing the cross-jamming between GNSS constellations. 
(Navipedia.net, 2014) 
 
2.3.3. ORBITS 
 
Galileo satellites have an orbit period of 14 hours and 7 minutes, having a 
ground-track repetition cycle of 10 days, presenting a ground path similar to the 
shown in the following figure.  
 
 
Figure 8 - Galileo satellite groundtrack 
 
The following figure shows the current state of Galileo’s constellation, 
presenting only 4 satellites in correct orbit. In the future is expected that 10 satellites 
will be placed in 3 orbital plans, with an inclination of 56º and a semi-major axis of 
29600 Km, on a MEO orbit. (Springer, 2014) 
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Figure 9 - Galileo constellation 
 
In the subsequent figure it is possible to see a satellite in a Galileo orbit. In this 
case, the satellite is not a 3D model of an actual spacecraft.  
 
 
Figure 10 - Galileo satellite view 
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2.4. BEIDOU 
 
2.4.1. HISTORY 
 
BeiDou Navigation Satellite System is a Chinese GNSS, consisting in two 
different constellations, one deployed for testing and operating since 2000 (BeiDou-
1) and the other one under construction, planned to reach full operability and global 
coverage by 2020.  
BeiDou started in 1983 with a proposal to develop a regional navigation system 
using geostationary satellites that was proved to be functional in 1989. So, four years 
later the BeiDou program officially started. Two experimental satellites were put in 
orbit in 2000 and a spare third one in 2003, the BeiDou-1 constellation. This set of 
satellites provided basic services to the Chinese government and military, including 
positioning and timing within China’s territory. Contrary to other previous GNSS, 
BeiDou required a receiver that could receive and transmit signals from and to 
satellites in order to obtain position. The system also required a control centre to do 
the PVT calculations for the users. These terminals were very expensive and by 
2009 there were only 50000 BeiDou-1 enabled units.  
The operational constrains of BeiDou-1 type of system made China announce 
a new constellation in 2006, BeiDou-2, using the same principles as GPS, 
GLONASS or Galileo, enabling precise PVT using passive receivers. During 2007-
2009 several meetings were held among China and USA/Russia/Europe in order to 
establish compatibility and interoperability between systems.  
The Beidou-2 constellation is very different from other GNSS since it will be 
composed of satellites in 3 different orbits: 5 in Geostationary Orbits (GEO), 3 on 
Inclined Geosynchronous Orbits (IGSO) and 27 (24 satellites plus 3 spares) on MEO. 
In 2014, there were 15 operational and active satellites, focused in Chinese territory. 
In 2020 global coverage is expected and by 2025 is estimated that the total number 
of BeiDou users will reach 900 million only in China, with an economic impact of € 65 
billion, making it an important asset to the GNSS world. (Astronautix.com, 2014) 
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2.4.2. SIGNALS 
 
BeiDou’s signals are not fully defined and its constitution is not available yet 
though it’s planned to be transmitted in 3 different bands, B1 at 1561.098 MHz, B2 at 
1207.14 MHz and B3 at 1268.52 MHz, using CDMA protocol.  
Each band will provide an open service, available to everyone, and an 
authorized service for special Chinese authorities, with better accuracies. 
(Navipedia.net, 2014) 
 
2.4.3. ORBITS 
 
BeiDou presents three different orbits, shown in the following picture. The 
yellow lines represents the orbit of the active four geostationary satellites, focusing 
Asian territory. In green the satellites with an inclined geosynchronous orbits. In white 
the satellites in MEO orbit. 
 
 
Figure 11 - BeiDou constellation 
 
In an IGSO orbit satellites have a period of 24 hours, having a major axis of 
35900 Km and an inclination of 55º. BeiDou MEO satellites  
BeiDou MEO satellites have an orbit period of 12 hours and 55 minutes, having 
a ground-track repetition cycle of 6 days. 
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Figure 12 - BeiDou IGSO satellite groundtrack 
 
 
Figure 13 - BeiDou MEO satellite groundtrack 
 
2.5. OTHER CONSTELLATIONS 
 
In this internship, only the previous 4 GNSS were used, though other countries 
are creating also their own systems, with global or regional cover. Also Satellite-
Based Augmentation Systems are being implemented, like EGNOS for Europe, 
WAAS for USA, GAGAN for India, etc. In the next figure is possible to see the actual 
status of the birdcage that surrounds us: 
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Figure 14 - GNSS birdcage 
 
The colours represent the country of the system: 
• Green – China (BeiDou) 
• Yellow – Europe (Galileo, EGNOS) 
• Orange – India (GAGAN) 
• Red – Russia (GLONASS, SDCM) 
• Blue – USA (GPS, WAAS) 
• White – Japan (QZSS) 
With so many satellites covering earth, once receivers are fully capable of 
detecting and tracking any signal, a lot of satellites will be visible from any point in 
the planet, any time, improving the quality of the positioning. In the following picture 
there is an example of the GNSS satellites visible from SAC premises in the 22nd of 
March 2014 at 8:40, with a total number of 32 satellites. 
 
Figure 15 - Satellites in view from SAC premises  
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3. GNSS APPLICATIONS 
 
(The Royal Academy of Engineer, 2011) 
As technologies evolve, becoming easier to use and more cost effective, they 
can become part of our daily life even without noticing it. If it’s a solution to an older 
problem the development is even faster and this is the case of GNSS, that’s the main 
reason why it has been adopted in an extensive list of applications. 
GNSS can be used as a primary set of an application, accompanied or not with 
other technologies to improve it. However, it can also be used as a secondary back-
up technology that will take over if other system stops working. From a few meters to 
a few centimetres, the offer is huge and the grade of accuracy needed is also an 
important factor to consider when adopting a GNSS solution, in positioning or in 
timing.  
 
 
Figure 16 - GNSS applications network (Source: SAC) 
 
The presented short list will showcase some important applications that are 
currently in use on some countries, and others that could be used in the near future 
due to the great asset they can become.  
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3.1. ROAD TRANSPORT 
 
Road transport applications are the top users of GNSS signals, by market 
segment value. Location-based services (LBS) using smartphones are the most 
numerous users, but road transport GNSS receivers are more expensive making the 
total market larger. In-car navigation is the most common, from non to demanding 
users. Commercial fleet management, taxi services, public transport monitoring and 
information, emergency vehicles location, mail and dispatches are examples of 
applications. Some roads, especially motorways, also benefit from GNSS-based toll 
systems.  
With the development of automated vehicles traffic management will evolve 
technologies like selective vehicle priorities, collision avoidance, dynamic route 
guidance, intelligent speed assistance and even lane control. 
Car theft is a traditional problem and GNSS can aid on locate and recover stolen 
vehicles. 
 
3.2. AVIATION 
 
Nowadays, aircrafts use GNSS for in-route navigation, enabling auto-piloting in 
certain situations and some countries have authorised GNSS based approaches to 
certain airfields. GNSS enabled Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast 
(ADS-B) is used in areas where there’s no radar coverage and enables to obtain 
position using GNSS and broadcasting to other aircrafts. It is also important in some 
specific tasks like flying in formation and mid-air refuel. 
 
3.3. MARITIME TRANSPORT 
 
Ocean and inshore navigation, port approaches, harbour entrance and docking 
is aided by GNSS. It also gives information to the Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) in order to identify a vessel, its position and communicate to other vessels 
nearby. Cargo handling can also have a GNSS receiver depending on the 
importance of the content. 
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3.4. RAIL 
 
Applications include the management of rolling stock, like location, speed, level 
crossings, trains separation and even power supply control. Some trains only open 
the doors when they are alongside the platform, when GNSS tells they are in the 
right position. Passengers also benefit from the system since they can have pre-trip 
and on-trip information. 
 
3.5. SCIENTIFIC  
 
Scientific purposes using GNSS require a great level of accuracy and a lot of 
activities rely on it, like geodesy and surveying, geoids determination and reference 
systems, environmental monitoring, meteorology, climate research, ionosphere 
analyses, structural monitoring, photogrammetry and hydrography. 
 
3.6. TIMING  
 
GNSS timing plays an important role on nowadays society. Synchronous 
technologies are more efficient than asynchronous ones but require a time source 
with a great level of accuracy, stability and reliability and GNSS can provide a cost-
effective solution. Therefore GNSS is used in network synchronisations, like 
communications, digital broadcasting, power generation and distribution or satellite 
monitoring. Financial systems also need precise time stamping to prioritise trades 
and provide audit trail. 
 
3.7. AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES 
 
Precise agriculture is expanding hugely and evolving to automatic guidance of 
farm machines using GNSS as primary navigation source. Navigation systems are 
also useful in parcels mapping. 
As stated previously, boats are equipped with GNSS receivers but in terms of 
fishing is also useful to monitor shoals, mapping best fishing areas. 
FCUP 
GNSS Vulnerabilities & Robustness  
43 
 
 
3.8. CRITICAL APPLICATIONS 
 
GNSS is now a significant aid in emergency vehicle location, dispatch and 
navigation, requiring a high level of availability and accuracy. New future Galileo 
services are expected to improve search and rescue, both for aviation and maritime, 
enabling communication between a receiver and satellites, and satellites to ground 
emergency bases, providing fast help, especially in remote areas where no network 
is available.  
GNSS and other technologies like RFID (Radio-Frequency Identification) can 
be used for tracking criminals and suspects, lowering the criminal level and being 
evidence in court. New similar principles are used to tag children or even animals 
that could get lost or in danger, and even elderly, handicapped or blind people. 
GNSS tagging can also be useful to protect and study endangered animals. 
  
44   FCUP 
GNSS Vulnerabilities & Robustness 
 
 
  
FCUP 
GNSS Vulnerabilities & Robustness  
45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
GNSS VULNERABILITIES 
  
46   FCUP 
GNSS Vulnerabilities & Robustness 
 
 
4. GNSS VULNERABILITIES 
 
Nowadays it is so simple to identify a position on a map, or even getting from a 
point A to a point B easily. GNSS in-car navigation has become widespread and a 
broad range of motorists rely entirely on GNSS for navigation and, if they were to 
have a backup, it probably hasn’t been used for a long term or is out-dated. This is a 
simple example of neglecting back-up systems but the list can be more serious when 
we take into account the applications on data networks, financial systems, science, 
shipping and air transport systems, agriculture, railways and emergency services. 
So, having a secure PNT solution is more essential than ever since it could impact 
national security and bring great economic losses. Today we just turn on our 
smartphone and everything is there, where we are, what’s around us, where we want 
to go, etc. Though, the big question is what to do in case of a failure, failure that is 
expected to become more critical with the development of GNSS technologies and 
applications.  
More important than adopting a GNSS technology because of its advantages is 
to be aware of its limitations. In critical services, GNSS vulnerabilities should be 
included in risk assessments, and reviewed regularly. For example, national or 
regional emergency services should review their GNSS dependencies, creating 
contingency plans for GNSS outages that could last from 10 min until several days, 
ensuring they have sufficient and efficient training in back up technologies. 
Satellite constellations are designed and created with the latest technologies to 
avoid or mitigate certain problems they can face in space, especially their high 
precise clocks and signal transmission capabilities, to ensure that users on earth can 
effectively use their services. Still, there’s a great distance between receivers and 
satellites, in between an atmosphere that can degrade signals quite easily, and an 
infinite range of scenarios on ground (urban canyons, forests, etc) that can block the 
signals. Human errors on operating satellites and receivers or hardware/software 
malfunctions, even though rare, can still happen, but, undoubtedly, the new GNSS 
threats that are growing faster are manmade, like jamming and spoofing. GNSS 
vulnerabilities can be broadly classified into three different categories: 
• System (including signals and receivers); 
• Propagation (atmospheric and multipath); 
• Interference (accidental or intentional). 
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The impact that these vulnerabilities can have on users is quite different but 
can vary from partial to complete loss of positioning and timing service, poor 
accuracies, great jumps in position, velocity or timing, and hazardously misleading 
information (HMI): data that seems correct but is dangerously wrong in safety critical 
applications. 
 
4.1. SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES 
 
4.1.1. GROUND AND SPACE SEGMENT 
 
The  main responsibilities of the GNSS ground segment includes maintaining 
and monitoring system time, controlling satellites, uploading the navigation data 
(clock data, almanac and ephemeris data) that will be broadcasted to users, and 
supervising, consequently, the signal in stations all around the world. The GNSS 
satellites carry high-precision clocks, signal generations, amplifiers, antennas and 
other hardware with respective software that are also subject to failure. Any failure, 
disruption or misbehaviour in either the ground component or the space component 
could potentially compromise the end-user experience, even though the GNSS are 
designed with high reliability in mind. 
 
4.1.1.1. FEW SATELLITES 
 
GNSS constellations require a constant renewal of the satellite fleet, to prevent 
against potential simultaneous failures of multiple spacecrafts and late delivery of 
new and more developed ones. If the number of available satellites drops below the 
designed minimum of 24, users can experience a reduction in service, position 
outages or even bad accuracies related to bad satellite geometry. To avoid this 
situation it is then necessary that a GNSS is funded through a long-term strong 
political and economic agreement and under strict management. It’s not expected 
that GPS will suffer from this, since it has been almost stable since its beginning. 
Though, the same does not apply to GLONASS that has been declared in FOC stage 
and later has seen the satellites number drop to 6, making the system almost 
unusable. Galileo is, unfortunately, an example of lack of political and economic 
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arrangements and this could compromise the launch of future satellites and 
consequent availability of the system. 
 
4.1.1.2. UPLOAD OF BAD NAVIGATION DATA 
 
Navigation data is uploaded to satellites routinely and it is the quality of that 
data that makes possible to have an accurate PVT. In case a bad page is uploaded 
to a satellite, the clock and the position of the satellite may be in error, which could 
confuse a receiver: not using that satellite or misleading it into wrong calculations. An 
extreme scenario of uploading bad data to every satellite on a constellation could 
happen, causing GNSS receivers to fail all over the world. 
In June 2002, March 2000 and March 1993 GPS wrong data uploads 
happened without serious consequences. In April 2014 wrong messages where 
uploaded to the GLONASS satellites, which resulted in errors bigger than 200 Km on 
some GLONASS enabled receivers or even loss of position. (staff, 2015) 
 
4.1.1.3. DRIFT OF SATELLITE CLOCKS 
 
GNSS principle relies on the performance of the precise atomic clocks placed 
on-board the satellites. As every machine, these clocks can behave unpredictably, 
even though it’s not likely, and consequently produce errors that can grow 
dangerously before a ground system or operator can notice and correct it or mark the 
satellite as unhealthy. In January 2004, the rubidium clock on-board a GPS satellite 
drifted for 3 hours before it was set as unusable, but by that time errors had grown 
until almost 300 Km. In July 2001 a similar case happened. 
 
4.1.1.4. BAD SIGNAL SHAPES  
 
Signal modulation hardware can be faulty and create unusual signal envelope 
that if transmitted can create unpredictable behaviour in receivers, ranging from  
dangerous errors to, in the best case, no impact, due to signal analyses 
implementation. In 1993 a GPS satellite transmitted an anomalous waveform, called 
‘evil waveform’, which caused an error of up to 8 meters. In March 2009 also a GPS 
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satellite carried a faulty L5 signal generator that interfered with other frequencies 
resulting in some substantial errors in receivers, depending on the elevation angle. 
 
4.1.1.5. ORBITAL ENVIRONMENT  
 
GNSS satellites are subject to intense radiation through their orbits. When solar 
storms happen space-crafts are subjected to highly energetic particles that can 
impact their lifetime, even though their design can mitigate the impact. Unusual 
intense events can occur causing temporary shutdown of satellites. In the worst case 
possible, if a super-storm like a Carrington event occurs, a series of satellites can be 
shut down at the same time causing a big impact on receivers in the ground. The last 
super-storm happened in 1859 but it could occur at any time. It has been predicted 
that there is a 12% chance of one happening between 2012-2022, so it can’t be 
ignored as a GNSS threat. 
 
4.1.1.6. ATTACKS ON GROUND SEGMENT  
 
The GNSS ground segments have been designed with the highest standards, 
but they are, as everything, still vulnerable to terrorism or cyber-attack, especially 
given that they are composed of worldwide distributed elements and considered high 
value installations. Even with the high standards at which they are operated and 
maintained, and the level of redundancies in place, an intentioned attack on the 
GNSS ground segment cannot be discarded as a GNSS vulnerability.  
Within this scenario, the fact that the various GNSS are operated by 
independent organisations and countries, gives some level of protection to the end 
user. 
 
4.1.2. USER SEGMENT 
 
GNSS user segment is quite sparse and uncoordinated, comprising an infinite 
range of receivers and equipment belonging to a wide range of manufactures from 
decryption-capable military receivers to the mass-market of smartphones. Different 
levels of quality is then required but even the simplest receiver is a complex 
combination of radio and digital hardware and software capable of decoding the 
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broadcasted GNSS signals, with its unique algorithms and methods. This results in 
different receivers providing different response to the same input or combination of 
inputs, and coming with its own bugs and exploitable vulnerabilities. 
Receiver’s manufactures need to think in advance and be alert to the GNSS 
developments in order to make their receivers able to outstand any condition and 
avoid vulnerabilities. 
 
4.1.2.1. WRONG TIME HANDLING  
 
Manufactures seek the correct function of GNSS receivers but some events 
occur rarely and may have been incorrectly accounted or implemented when building 
particular equipment. GPS time is managed in terms of seconds of week, and 
respective week. In August 1999 the week 1024 was reached and a reset was done 
in order to proceed with correct data transmission, since weeks over 1024 needed 
more bits in the modulated signals. So, GPS satellites started emitting signals with 
time information regarding week 1. Some receivers wrongly interpreted the signals 
and calculated the time as January 1980, the beginning of GPS time-scale, because 
they weren’t ready to handle this type of event and needed a firmware fix. A similar 
example happens with leap seconds that are introduced in the system when needed. 
Some receivers still don’t work properly and cause a timing error, even though there 
are specifications in how to handle them. 
 
4.1.2.2. SYSTEM UPGRADES 
 
GNSS pursue stability but upgrades occur and cause unexpected performance 
in receivers. In April 2007, a 32nd satellite was added to GPS constellation and 
provoked some problems in receivers that were only capable of handling 31. 
In January 2010, GPS ground segment software was updated resulting in a 
faulty performance of military and timing receivers. 
 
4.1.2.3. RECEIVER BUGS 
 
In some areas like military or aviation, receivers’ performance needs to comply 
with demanding standards, therefore manufactures need certification to their 
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equipment. Other low cost systems just need to pass manufacturer’s production test 
regime, and is probable that some are not free from software bugs that will affect 
their performance. Examples of common bugs are the wrong handling of unhealthy 
satellites, tracking of non-standard codes, behaviour when signals are stronger or 
weaker than expected, reaction to jamming or spoofing, changes or updates on 
GNSS, etc.  
 
4.1.2.4. GNSS ENHANCEMENT TECHNOLOGIES 
 
Systems created to enhance GNSS performance can introduce also some 
vulnerability into the system.  
SBAS satellites (EGNOS, WAAS, etc) are becoming increasingly important in a 
series of applications, especially aviation, promising integrity and high accuracy. 
Though, as any GNSS satellite, they are also subject to failure, due to equipment 
fault or even to ionospheric disruptions.  
A-GNSS is used broadly in smartphones, downloading external ephemeris data 
that can speed up satellite acquisition. However, a bad ephemeris download can 
degrade receivers’ performance, increasing fix time or even causing poor accuracies. 
 
4.2. PROPAGATION VULNERABILITIES  
 
4.2.1. ATMOSPHERIC VULNERABILITIES 
 
GNSS signals must pass through 20 000 Km to 25 000 Km of space and earth 
atmosphere before it reaches the ground based applications, and when a signal hits 
the surface the strength may be -130 dBm, almost as low as the noise floor. 
Consequently, GNSS signals are affected by the atmospheric medium they pass 
through. Space weather impacts the performance of space applications and even 
human health and safety, including direct effects from sun, solar winds, and changes 
in magnetosphere, ionosphere and thermosphere. Unfortunately the atmosphere is 
quite variable in time and space creating difficulties on minimizing the effects on 
GNSS signals. 
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The dry troposphere layer can impact modestly GNSS signals since delays can 
be largely mitigated with a model. However, the wet component can impact randomly 
and its behaviour is somehow unexpected.  
The ionosphere layer can introduce the largest errors in GNSS if not properly 
corrected. Ionospheric impacts are more severe at high and low latitudes and can be 
quite severe in peaks of the solar cycle. Ionospheric errors are often refered to in 
terms of the Total Electron Count (TEC) through which the satellite signal passes. 
Slow and fast variations are described in the next two sections. Scintillations are 
another ionospheric effect and are described afterwards. 
 
4.2.2. SLOW VARIATIONS IN TEC 
 
GNSS signals are delayed in proportion to the TEC along the path between 
satellite-receiver. TEC variations are caused by the sun effect on the ionosphere 
indirectly, like: earth’s diurnal rotation, sun variability, the sun’s 27-day rotation and 
sun’s activity cycle of 11 years, which can cause the electrons column to rise or fall. 
So, TEC can produce unmodelled variations on GNSS range measurements, which 
can be mitigated using estimated corrections, Differential GPS corrections, 
combining measurements/observations or using dual frequency GNSS receivers. 
 
4.2.3. FAST VARIATIONS IN TEC 
 
Solar flares and coronel mass ejections can produce fast variations in TEC, 
and depending on the gravity of the storm they can’t be corrected by SBAS and other 
systems, though they can be detected. However, the disruption on GNSS signals will 
also affect SBAS systems. Mitigation can still be possible using dual frequency 
receivers. 
 
4.2.4. SCINTILLATION  
 
Scintillation is a small-scale perturbation in the ionosphere, occurring more 
frequently over the equator and near the poles, though it can be more widespread. If 
designed properly a receiver would be able to identify the fast variation in phase and 
amplitude, but if not it could lose signal lock. In October and November 2003 a solar 
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storm happened causing scintillation effects and disabled the WAAS network for 30 
hours. 
 
4.2.5. CARRINGTON EVENTS 
 
As stated previously, a Carrington event can impact satellites directly causing 
temporary shutdowns, but even the signal transmission can be cancelled. Since it’s 
not a predictable occurrence and the latest was 1859, far from satellite era, its 
potential impact and consequences are not fully well characterised. 
 
4.2.6. NUCLEAR TESTS 
 
Nuclear explosions in the upper atmosphere have been proposed as an 
effective manner of disrupting GNSS and other satellite and earth systems. 
 
4.2.7. MULTIPATH  
 
Multipath describes when a receiver tracks a reflected signal rather than the 
direct signal from the satellite. Since a reflected signal does not follow the minimum 
distance path (linear) between satellite and receiver, it provides a delayed 
measurement that will cause an error in timing and position.  
GNSS signals can reflect in distant objects like buildings, or even trees, 
producing gross errors. Multipath is a quite well known phenomenon by scientists 
and receiver manufacturers but its mitigation is quite hard since there is a huge set of 
scenarios around where a receiver can be placed: from a full sky view to a urban-
canyon (representative situation where just a small part of sky is clear). However 
mitigation techniques have been applied in antennas, rejecting signals bellow certain 
elevation angle, and in receivers filtering and processing techniques. For low-cost 
receivers multipath errors can range from tens to hundreds of meters, making GNSS 
not suitable, yet, to autonomous car navigation for example. Even though multipath 
can be considered as vulnerability, due to its unpredictability, is more common to 
treat it like an error source. 
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4.3. INTERFERENCE 
 
4.3.1. ACCIDENTAL 
 
GNSS signal has so low power on Earth surface that accidental interference 
can impact receivers. Harmonic emissions from commercial high power transmitters, 
ultra wideband radar, television, VHF, mobile satellite services and personal 
electronics are examples of interference that can in an extreme case cause complete 
loss of lock. In 2002 a CCTV camera in Douglas, Isle of Man, United Kingdom, 
caused GPS signal blockage within 1 Km. 
 
4.3.2. DELIBERATE 
 
There are two important types of deliberate interference than can easily impact 
GNSS receivers making them useless or misled: jamming and spoofing.  
Jamming is, for sure, the biggest GNSS vulnerability that can impact even the 
most expensive and developed receiver. A jammer simply transmits a noise signal 
across usually one GNSS frequency (normally GPS/Galileo L1/E1), but could target 
multiple frequencies simultaneously, in order to raise the noise level or overload 
receiver’s circuits causing loss of lock. 
Jammers can be bought easily on the Internet for less than € 30, they fit into a 
pocket and to make it work you just need to simply plug it into a car lighter socket. 
Depending on the specifications, they can block signal from any constellation, even 
Galileo wish is not fully operational yet, and more expensive ones can block at the 
same time Wi-Fi and mobile phone frequencies. There is a broad range of jammers, 
from small devices that only impact a few meters around the jammer, to others that 
can go until a few kilometres. The use and selling of jammers is completely forbidden 
in most European countries, like Portugal and the United Kingdom. In the United 
States of America, homeland of GPS, is also considered a crime since it can impact 
dramatically critical safety GNSS applications. 
Modern GNSS receivers with well-designed noise filtering and adaptive 
antennas can bypass low and medium levels of jamming (even with some difficulty), 
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although piracy is always some steps ahead and there are jammers that transmit 
structured signals rather than random noise, to bypass the filters.  
Until this moment, critical events regarding jamming focus on car theft, avoiding 
fleet control systems and other events with limited consequences: like a jammer 
passing nearby Newark airport (New Jersey, USA) and affecting the airports’ GNSS 
ground-based augmentation systems or North Korea jamming South Korean border.  
Spoofing is a more sophisticated type of interference, requiring quite technical 
equipment, like GNSS simulators, and consists on sending false GNSS signals in 
order to mislead a receiver, outputting wrong and misleading PVT solutions. 
Spoofing is technically challenging to produce in a real world situation but its 
consequences can be catastrophic. Fooling a receiver, without any warning, can, for 
example, put a boat navigating in a specific route directly into pirate hands.  
The University of Austin (Texas, USA) made successful tests on spoofing a 
vessel in high sea, putting a boat drifting in a wrong route without any warning. They 
also successfully tested and controlled remotely a UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), 
trying to reproduce and demonstrate the possibility that an USA drone was taken 
down using spoofing techniques in Iran in 2011. This study was quite impressive 
when we think that anyone can simply hijack a UAV, making it crash to a building, to 
the ground, fill it with explosives and have dramatic effects. (Utexas.edu, 2015) 
In the next chapter, jamming and spoofing will be more developed and some 
in-lab tests results, produced during the internship, will be provided and used to 
assess the impact of jamming and spoofing on commercially available receivers.  
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CHAPTER V 
JAMMING & SPOOFING TRIALS 
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5. JAMMING & SPOOFING TRIALS 
 
5.1. JAMMING 
 
Jamming is not a new phenomenon, it has been alive since the start of signal 
transmission via electromagnetic waves in order to intercept or block any kind of 
communication in a deliberate way. Common frequencies like Wi-Fi, GSM, UMTS, 
LTE or VHF can be easily jammed and its impact can vary as much as the reasons 
to do it. During wars jamming is frequent in order to impact the enemies, or in some 
places jammers can be placed to avoid communication to the outside for security 
purposes. Nowadays, new signals became important in a lot of applications, like 
GNSS frequencies, becoming a target for jamming. 
 
 
Figure 17 - Detection of jammer location (Source: Pedro Alfaro Sanz) 
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Jamming can be split into four different types: 
• Accidental; 
• Criminal; 
• Red Team; 
• Blue Team. 
Accidental jamming is generally caused by the transmission of signals close to 
GNSS frequencies and can easily disrupt communications due to the GNSS weak 
signal from space. This issue is usually something localized and potentially 
manageable once identified. 
Criminal jamming is the most common type and is caused by people who seek 
to avoid GNSS tracking devices, like car thieves, toll evaders, and tracker evaders, 
drivers who want to avoid mileage limits or bosses’ knowledge of their movements. 
These events are usually a result of low power jammers and its users don’t usually 
care (nor understand) about power levels and the impact on other receivers nearby. 
It’s usually a momentary event with small impact due to the movement of jammer. 
Red Team (generic term for enemy/criminal/terrorism) jamming may be 
targeted at some specific aspects of critical infrastructures or applications, likely to be 
high power and may occur at a number of locations simultaneously.  
Blue Team (generic term for friendly force) is used mainly to overtake hidden 
trackers. It can be compared to criminal jamming in terms of power however if 
stationary for long periods near critical infrastructures the threat can be considerable.  
 
5.1.1. JAMMERS 
 
Devices that claim to block GNSS signals are widely available on the Internet, 
having a cost of tens up to several hundreds of euros. Even though buying and using 
them is illegal, their popularity is increasing and starting to be a threat to GNSS 
integrity. Jammer’s specification and effectiveness publicized by manufactures are 
usually beyond their actual power and their ranges can go from a few meters to 
several tens of meters, consuming a fraction of Watt to several Watts. 
Small jammers are sometimes fitted in cars and trucks to block any GPS-based 
tracking on the vehicle. This type of low-power jammer is also called Personal 
Privacy Devices (PPD’s) transmit at or near L1/E1 frequency (1575.42 MHz), thus 
new and more advanced models transmit also in L2 (1227.60 MHz), future L5/E5 
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(1176.45 MHz) and also GLONASS L1 (around 1602.00 MHz). It is expected that as 
more bands are introduced, jammers will follow the evolution.  
Ryan H. Mitch et al groups jammers in three different categories based on 
power-source and antenna type: the first group encompasses jammers designed to 
plug into a 12 V car lighter socket (powers can vary from 1 mW to 10 mW), the 
second category contains the ones powered by and internal rechargeable battery 
and have external antennas connected via SMA (powers can go from 1 mW to 250 
mW); the third group includes the ones that have batteries but do not have external 
antennas (very low power, 1 mW). (Mitch et al., 2011) 
 
 
Figure 18 - Types of Jammers (Source: Google) 
 
There are many types of RF interference, including tones, swept waveforms, 
pulse narrowband noise, broadband noise and other multi-frequency and time-
varying versions of the referred methods. Thomas Kraus et al. gathered several 
types of jammers from different manufactures and analysed their performance, 
grouping them by transmitted signal type: 
• Class I: Continuous wave (CW signal); 
• Class II: Chirp signal with one saw-tooth function; 
• Class II: Chirp signal with multi saw-tooth functions. 
• Class IV: Chirp signal with frequency bursts. 
Most of PPD’s belong to class II, having unidirectional chirp signals. They have 
one positive saw-tooth function describing the instantaneous frequency and a 
negative slope that is extremely higher than the positive one. Sweep times can vary 
from 8 to 30 µsec and the bandwidth goes from 10 to 30 MHz. (Kraus et al., 2011) 
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Graphic 1 - Chirp signal with one saw-tooth function (Source: Google) 
 
5.1.2. TRIALS 
 
(Dixon et al., 2013) 
Commercial receivers behave unpredictably when there is jamming noise. 
Experiments have been conducted by several entities, especially maritime ones, to 
assess the impact of jammers in different applications, evaluating and quantifying the 
consequences. Some receivers gave wrong information rather than reporting an 
error, showing great inaccuracies like Km’s a part from its actual position or speeds 
of more than 1000 Km/h for a simple ship. In some cases, when high precision was 
needed for safety situations, receivers reported HMI (Hazardously Misleading 
Information) of tens or hundreds of meters, and courses and speeds wrong in few 
degrees and knots. The consequences of HMI can be quite serious if vessels 
navigate in low visibility, broadcasting erroneous position to other ships through the 
AIS. 
In order to measure the impact of jammers on receivers, Satellite Applications 
Catapult conducted several in-lab experiments, guided by the previous work done by 
Dr. Chaz Dixon, as documented in the STAVOG study. These trials were conducted 
during the period of May to August 2014, having as a prime objective to analyse the 
behaviour under jamming of two types of receivers (one low-end other high-cost) in 
terms of positioning output. 
Project planning was executed and is presented as an attachment to this report 
(annexe 4). Initially planned to represent an in-land vehicle, was later changed to a 
maritime application, though the planning document was not updated, as the 
principles were not modified. The change was justified as it would allow to analyse 
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and validate SAC capabilities and its equipment against the reference work 
previously performed in STAVOG. 
 
5.1.2.1. EQUIPMENT 
 
The equipment used in these trials and its main connections can be seen in the 
following scheme: 
 
Figure 19 - Jamming trials equipment scheme 
 
The GNSS simulator unit was responsible for producing the GNSS signal (GPS 
L1) and the interference as well. An alternative is to use the GNSS simulator to emit 
GNSS signals and to use a separate interference source connected in via an RF 
combiner. The advantage of the simulator-only approach is that all important 
parameters including jamming power can be controlled by the same software suite. 
In the circuit two amplifiers were introduced, one LNA (Low-Noise Amplifier) and a 
VGA (Variable Gain Amplifier). Both amplifiers were powered with two different 
power suppliers at 15 V in order to achieve the biggest signal amplification. A RF 
splitter divided the signal into two outputs, one that plugs directly to the high-end 
receiver (named Rx1), and the other plugs to the TEM (Transverse Electromagnetic) 
cell where the low-end receiver (named Rx2) is placed. A computer was connected 
by USB to Rx1 and via Bluetooth to the Rx2 in order to record the data. Receivers 
were fully reset at the beginning of every simulation. 
Rx1 is a GPS/GLONASS/Galileo/BeiDou/SBAS enabled receiver, multi-
frequency having phase and range measurements. Rx2 is an external Bluetooth 
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GPS/GLONASS/SBAS L1 receiver, with only range measurements. Rx1 and Rx2 
manufactures and models are not presented in this report due to confidentiality 
terms. 
The amplifiers were mainly used to compensate the TEM cell signal losses 
inside the chamber, so that the Rx2 could track GPS with normal C/N, and to also 
compensate for cable losses.  
NMEA messages were recorded using Rx1 proprietary software and Quantum 
GIS for Rx2. Python was used to programme the necessary scripts for analysing 
data. 
The simulator had a control centre software where every involved parameter 
was fully customizable. In order to run a simulation it was needed to set the time of 
simulation, upload the almanac for the desired week, add track file and arrange the 
interference times and power levels. As soon as these steps were completed and the 
connection scheme was in place, it was possible to start the simulation. 
 
 
Figure 20 - GNSS simulator control software 
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5.1.2.2. DATA ANALYSES SCRIPTS 
 
Python scripts were developed during the internship to analyse data. These 
scripts read the NMEA messages outputted by the simulator, the reference track, 
and compared them to the ones outputted by the receivers.  
Python was the programming language chosen since it is open source and 
highly customizable, having also easy to use and powerful plotting modules. 
The script processes the reference track, reads the $GPGGA messages and 
divides the information into a table with separate fields for timestamp, latitude, 
longitude, height, satellites in view and Horizontal Dilution of Precision (HDOP). 
Then, the same is done to the receivers’ output. 
In the next step, the script compares the time stamp of both NMEA files and 
analyses where they match, comparing the coordinates and calculating the error in 
meters. For this, it is calculated the meridian and parallel radius of curvature, and 
consequently how much is a meridian and parallel arc at the given latitudes, giving 
the distance between points in meters. It’s a simple approximation, since the 
distance between points is very small and there is no need to calculate great-circle 
distances, since they would be roughly the same with these distances. 
Once the planimetric error is calculated is given the average, standard 
deviation, maximum and minimum errors for horizontal and vertical measurements. 
It’s then possible to plot the information in 5 different graphics: 
• Planimetric error in latitude and longitude; 
• Global horizontal error over time; 
• Global vertical error over time; 
• Satellites in view over time; 
• HDOP over time. 
The script also outputs the planimetric error over time to a *.csv file in order to 
create the graphs used on these report, using Microsoft Excel. 
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This is an example of the output of the script: 
 
::::: TRACK ANALYSES :::::: 
 
----- Analysis Period ----- 
Start:    12:15:0 
End:      13:35:0 
 
----- Reference Track ----- 
Filename: Scenario 1.txt 
Start:    12:0:0.0 
End:      6:27:14.0 
 
------- Study File -------- 
Filename: rx2_cw25.txt 
Start:    12:5:19.0 
End:      13:38:50.5 
 
-- Horizontal Statistics -- 
 
AVG [m]:  0.762 
STD [m]:  0.359 
RMS [m]:  0.842 
MAX [m]:  2.388 
MIN [m]:  0.021 
VAR [m]:  2.367 
 
--- Vertical Statistics --- 
 
AVG [m]:  0.073 
STD [m]:  1.272 
MAX [m]:  5.030 
MIN [m]:  -1.700 
VAR [m]:  6.730 
 
---> Measurements: 1801 
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Graphic 2 - Python script example of position error 
 
Graphic 3 - Python script example of graphs 
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5.1.2.3. SCENARIO 1 
 
The first scenario simulated a powerful jammer on shore as a vessel passes by 
it, approximately 6 Km away, near Flamborough Head, United Kingdom 
(approximately N 54.1160º W 0.0830º). The jammer was equipped with a yagi 
antenna, an antenna with a powerful centre main lobe followed by two weaker side 
lobes. The vessel starts its movement passing by a zone with no interference for a 
long time in order to acquire full almanac from satellites. After that period it would 
pass through jammer’s first side lobe, experiencing moderate interference, followed 
by the main lobe with high jamming, the second side lobe and, finally, no interference 
again. The ship would move at, approximately, 10 knots (19 Km/h) in a uniform 
straight track of 14 nautical miles (25 Km).  
 
 
Figure 21 - Scenario sketch 
 
A jammer on shore (yellow triangle) emits noise with the main lobe’s area of 
action in red, and side lobes in yellow. The green line represents the ship movement. 
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5.1.2.3.1. SETUP 
 
Simulated track files (*.umt) need to be created using a NMEA message file 
and to achieve this we need point’s coordinates and vessel heading.  
Start and end points were given, though two extra points were extrapolated in 
order to give more time for the vessel to acquire full navigation from satellites. 
 
 Time Latitude Longitude Height 
Start Point 0 min N 54.245980º W 0.190758º 0 m 
Study Period Start Point 15 min N 54.215417º W 0.131050º 0 m 
Study Period End Point 95 min N 54.080800º E 0.118450º 0 m 
End Point 110 min N 54.054228º E 0.166608º 0 m 
Table 1 – Track 1 reference points 
 
With the coordinates it was possible to create fake NMEA $GPRMC messages 
that the system could read and convert to the desired format. The headings, also 
necessary in this type of message, were calculated using a Matlab 
(http://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab/) function called azimuth. Since it was a 
straight line the heading was always the same, resulting in: 
 
$GPRMC,114500,A,5414.7588,N,00011.4455,W,0,0,070314,0.0,E,D 
$GPRMC,120000,A,5412.9250,N,00007.8630,W,10,132.6,070314,0.0,E,D 
$GPRMC,132000,A,5404.8480,N,00007.1070,E,10,132.6,070314,0.0,E,D 
$GPRMC,133500,A,5403.2537,N,00009.9965,E,0,132.6,070314,0.0,E,D 
 
Finally, the respective converter was used and the *.umt files was imported to 
the simulator. 
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Figure 22 – Scenario 1 location 
 
Three different types of jammers with different powers (23 mW, 640 mW and 
25 W) and three types of interference [continuous wave (CW) signal, broadband 2 
MHz and broadband 20 MHz] were simulated for the same track. 
It must be raised that in the STAVOG study two of the most common types of 
interference were not tested: chirp signal and pulsed interference. Chirp signals were 
not possible to simulate due to hardware limitations regarding the sweep times of the 
needed signals and the pulsed interference didn’t have any impact on receivers. 
Consequently only Kraus’ Class I type of PPD was possible to test, completed with 
broadband noise. 
Jammer’s full power was desired in the middle of the track, in order to simulate 
a yagi antenna main beam, so, a middle point was calculated along the track and 
consequently the distance between jammer-vessel was obtained: 5.9 Km. Having the 
distance and the power level of the jammer, it was only necessary to get the signal 
power at the vessel’s location. In order to achieve this a few calculations were made: 
• Calculate the power ratio in dBm’s at the transmitter using: 
 dBm = ! log!"(mW)×10 (1) 
 
23 mW = 14 dBm | 640 mW = 28 dBm | 25 W = 44 dBm 
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• Get free-space path power loss (FSPL) for the desired distance (5.9 Km) 
at the GPS L1 frequency (1575.42 MHz) using antennas without gain or 
attenuation: 
 !"#$! !" = !20!!"#!"! 5.9 + !20!!"#!"! 1575.42 + 32.45 = 112!!" (2) 
 
So, in the receiver, the jamming signal power would be: 
 !"#$%!!"#"!!!"!!" = !!"# − !"#$ (3) 
23 mW = -98 dBm | 640 mW = -84 dBm | 25 W = -68 dBm 
 
These power levels were a first approximation for the interference power to use 
in the simulator, though the actual simulated results vary 2 dB for a 23 mW and 640 
mW and 16 dB for the powerful 25 W one, as used in STAVOG. In the graphic 5 it is 
possible to see that there is a powerful main beam followed by two side lobes slightly 
weaker, simulating a yagi antenna. 
Finally the interference levels were added to the simulator and the scenario 
was played nine times, for three different types of interference at three different 
power levels: 
• 23 mW CW jammer signal; 
• 640 mW CW jammer signal; 
• 25 W CW jammer signal; 
• 23 mW 2 MHz broadband jammer signal; 
• 640 mW 2 MHz broadband jammer signal; 
• 25 W 2 MHz broadband jammer signal; 
• 23 mW 20 MHz broadband jammer signal; 
• 640 mW 20 MHz broadband jammer signal; 
• 25 W 20 MHz broadband jammer signal. 
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Graphic 4 - Jammer signal power at Rx over time for different PPD powers 
 
5.1.2.3.2. RESULTS 
 
The receivers present different behaviours when outputting position. When 
there is no interference applied, Rx1 presents more smooth measurements though 
the errors are higher than Rx2. Rx1, the high-end receiver, shows an error up to 3.5 
m, getting below 1 m after 40 min, Rx2, the low-end receiver, goes up 1.2 m and 
after the same period lowers to 0.8 m. This results were obtained for a specific 
simulation time, so factors like satellite positions, and consequent DOP, can affect 
the receivers performance. 
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Graphic 5 - Planimetric error of receiver 1 over time when no jamming is applied 
 
 
Graphic 6 - Planimetric error of receiver 2 over time when no jamming is applied 
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Applying 23 mW interference of broadband noise had no effect on the 
receivers. The CW signal provoked some jumps up to 5 m on Rx1 when the highest 
point of jamming was reached, approximately -100 dBm. Rx2 is not affected. 
 
 
Graphic 7 - Planimetric error of receiver 1 over time when 23 mW CW noise is applied 
 
A CW signal of 640 mW had effect on both receivers, especially on Rx1 where 
the planimetric error increased until 12 m for a few moments when approximately -80 
dBm was applied. During the same period, Rx2 grew the error until 2.5 m, not 
significantly.  
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Graphic 8 - Planimetric error of receiver 1 over time when 640 mW CW noise is applied 
 
The 2 MHz broadband interference of 640 mW power trial had distinct effect on 
both receivers. 
When Rx1 entered in the main lobe, around -85 dBm, it stopped its 
smoothness and started behaving randomly, reaching a peak of a dangerous 600 m 
(HMI) before losing signal. 8 minutes later the receiver got signal again and showed 
normal behaviour until the end. 
Rx2 seemed affected by the interference during its passage by the main lobe, 
though the error didn’t present significant errors, below 2 m. After the interference 
ceased, the receiver passed through a period of no signal, followed by 11 m peak 
error, continuing with 3 m error for more than 10 min with 5 m peak in the end of that 
period, getting back to normal (less than 1 m) few moments before the end of the 
scenario. This behaviour may not be directly related to the jamming but an anomaly 
on the receiver’s performance. 
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Graphic 9 - Planimetric error of receiver 1 over time when 640 mW 2 MHz BB noise is applied 
 
 
Graphic 10 - Planimetric error of receiver 1 over time when 640 mW 2 MHz BB noise is applied zoomed 
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Graphic 11 - Planimetric error of receiver 2 over time when 640 mW 2 MHz BB noise is applied 
 
The 20 MHz broadband interference at 640 mW had not effect on the 
receivers. 
A 25 W CW jammer on shore, 6 Km away from a vessel is effective, blocking 
completely as soon as the receiver enters the interference area of action, at -85 
dBm. 
 
 
Graphic 12 - Planimetric error of receiver 1 (left) and 2 (right) over time when 25 W CW noise is applied 
 
For Rx1 the 2 MHz broadband signal had almost the same effect as Rx2, 
complete loss of position as soon it receives jamming.  
FCUP 
GNSS Vulnerabilities & Robustness  
77 
 
 
For the 20 MHz broadband signal, Rx1 took a little more time to lose position, 
giving errors ranging from 3 to 11 m in the first 5 min of interference. During the lobes 
there was no position except on the first gap between the side and main lobe with 7 
m planimetric error. 
In the 2 Mhz noise Rx2 had a similar behaviour to the Rx1 20 Mhz noise, 
though it recovered position with a big planimetric error (>10 m) in both side lobes. 
Surprisingly the Rx2 kept position almost all the time during the 20 Mhz broadband 
interference, with small moments with no position and errors ranging on average 
from 4 to 10 m, with a maximum of more than 50 m for a few seconds. 
 
 
Graphic 13 - Planimetric error of receiver 2 over time when 25 W 20 MHz BB noise is applied 
 
On a global analyses it is undoubtable that interference is a threat and can 
have a very dangerous impact on receivers. Rx1 showed big errors for a high-end 
receiver. Factory reset was performed before each of the tests, to start from a clean 
setup. It could not be discarded that the receiver was incorrectly configured, or that 
the same receiver would have shown a better behaviour with a different firmware. 
Rx2 affirmed to be very resistant to the types of jamming tested and presented very 
low errors (< 1 m) in almost every moment of the tests when giving PVT. 
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A continuous wave is the most effective type of noise signal that can interfere 
with the equipment even in low power, 23 mW.  
A 25 W jammer can be assembled from equipment readily available in the 
internet or in many electronic laboratories or universities, and if enabled on shore, it 
can affect boats in a radius of 6 Km, or even more, which can have critical security 
impacts. In these trials errors of 50 m up to 600 m were obtained, which make the 
receivers quite vulnerable since it can be better not to have PVT and sound an alarm 
rather than giving HMI. 
 
5.1.2.4. SCENARIO 2 
 
On the second scenario a set of jammers inside a vessel, as it approaches 
Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom (approximately N 55.0090º W 1.4450 º) was 
simulated. The vessel starts its movement passing by a zone with no interference 
time in order to acquire full navigation message from satellites. After that period and 
during its path the vessel encounters six types of jamming power, simulating different 
PPD powers and distances to a GNSS antenna. The ship movement lasts around 
120 minutes during a 28 nautical miles path (52 Km), ending in a harbour. The 
jammer would be placed bellow the GNSS antenna, resulting in a 10 dB attenuation 
on the received signal. 
 
5.1.2.4.1. SETUP 
 
The track file for this scenario was slightly more challenging than the first one 
since it shows a turn on the vessel path. Start, middle and end points were given as 
reference: 
 Time Latitude Longitude Height 
Start Point 0 min N 55.30º W 1.20º 0 m 
Middle Point 50 min N 55.10º W 1.00º 0 m 
End Point 120 min N 55.01º W 1.43º 0 m 
Table 2 – Track 2 reference points 
 
In Google Earth the path was drew and converted to a shapefile using 
Quantum GIS. Consequently the shapefile was converted from WGS84 (EPSG: 
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4326) to Ordnance Survey Great Britain’s Grid (EPSG: 27700) in order to have 
measurements in meters, and consequently the perimeter of the path was calculated. 
With these values it was possible to calculate the velocity of the ship and how many 
meters the ship moves per second. Using GRASS’ v.to.points 
(http://grass.osgeo.org/) function was possible to split the projected shapefile into 
points one second apart from each other. The coordinates were extracted from those 
points and converted again to WGS84, using PROJ4 (http://trac.osgeo.org/proj/). 
With the final coordinates it was then possible to calculate headings and finally 
create the fake NMEA file, convert it to *.umt file and import it to the simulator. 
 
 
Figure 23 – Scenario 2 location 
 
In these trials four different jamming powers (0.001 mW, 0.01 mW, 0.1 mW and 
1 mW) at three different distances from PPD to antenna (5, 15 and 30 m) were 
tested. Using equation 1 is possible to calculate the power ratio for each power: 
 
0.001 mW = -30 dBm | 0.01 mW = -20 dBm | 0.1 mW = -10 dBm | 1 mW = 0 dBm 
 
The FSPL values (equation 2) are: 
 
5 m = 50 dB | 15 m = 60 dB | 30 m = 66 dB 
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Consequently the jamming power at receiver is calculated using equation 3, 
adding 10 dB for the antenna attenuation, resulting in: 
 
 5 m 15 m 30 m 
0.001 mW -90 dBm -100 dBm -106 dBm 
0.01 mW -80 dBm -90 dBm -96 dBm 
0.1 mW -70 dBm -80 dBm -86 dBm 
1 mW -60 dBm -70 dBm -76 dBm 
Table 3 - Signal level at receiver for different jammer power at different distances 
 
Jamming powers were applied to the track according to the following graphic: 
 
 
Graphic 14 - Jammer signal power at Rx over time for different PPD powers and distances 
 
Jamming periods of 0.001 mW were combined in the same track with 0.01 mW, 
and similarly, 0.1 mW with 1 mW, at the times stated in the graph. 
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The interference levels were uploaded to the simulator and the scenario was 
played 6 times, using: 
• 0.001 mW CW jammer signal at 5, 15 and 30 m followed by 0.01 mW CW 
signal at 5, 15 and 30m; 
• 0.1 mW CW jammer signal at 5, 15 and 30 m followed by 1 mW CW 
signal at 5, 15 and 30m; 
• 0.001 mW 2 MHz broadband jammer signal at 5, 15 and 30 m followed 
by 0.01 mW 2 MHz broadband signal at 5, 15 and 30m; 
• 0.1 mW 2 MHz broadband jammer signal at 5, 15 and 30 m followed by 1 
mW 2 MHz broadband signal at 5, 15 and 30m; 
• 0.001 mW 20 MHz broadband jammer signal at 5, 15 and 30 m followed 
by 0.01 mW 20 MHz broadband signal at 5, 15 and 30m; 
• 0.1 mW 20 MHz broadband jammer signal at 5, 15 and 30 m followed by 
1 mW 20 MHz broadband signal at 5, 15 and 30m; 
 
5.1.2.4.2. RESULTS 
 
 As in the previous scenario, CW noise is more effective than broadband one. 
Rx1 is affected even by the weakest power signal 0.001 mW at 5 m away from the 
interference source, at -90 dBm. The 0.01 mW jammer makes the receiver cease 
PVT output at 5 m (-80 dBm), and gives some considerable errors (6-10 m) when 
located  15 m away.  
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Graphic 15 - Planimetric error of receiver 1 over time when 0.001 mW at (5, 15 and 30 m) and 0.01 mW at (5, 15 and 
30 m) CW noise is applied 
 
Rx2 also lost PVT at the same signal power as Rx1, still being affected at -90 
dBm, giving positions with more planimetric error than in normal conditions. A 0.001 
mW PPD seems to have no effect on receiver 2. 
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Graphic 16 - Planimetric error of receiver 2 over time when 0.001 mW at (5, 15 and 30 m) and 0.01 mW at (5, 15 and 
30 m) CW noise is applied 
 
The 0.1 mW jammer had effect at 5 m, though distances of 15 m and 30 m had 
small impact on Rx1. 
Rx1 and Rx2 had similar impact by a 1 mW jammer at 5 m, 15 m and 30 m, no 
PVT at all. Although, Rx1 suffered a period of high HMI from 40 to 80 m. Is then 
possible to affirm that between -80 dBm to -70 dBm both receivers drop positioning 
for a CW type jammer. 
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Graphic 17 - Planimetric error of receiver 1 over time when 0.1 mW at (5, 15 and 30 m) and 1 mW at (5, 15 and 30 
m) CW noise is applied 
 
Graphic 18 - Planimetric error of receiver 2 over time when 0.1 mW at (5, 15 and 30 m) and 1 mW at (5, 15 and 30 
m) CW noise is applied 
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0.001 mW and 0.01 mW PPD transmitting 2 MHz broadband noise had similar 
effect on both receivers, only showing change of performance at -80 dBm, with Rx1 
loosing PVT and Rx2 outputting erroneous position reaching 3 m during the 
interference interval.  
0.1 mW and 1 mW with 2 MHz broadband PPD had impact on both receivers 
as long as the power at the receiver was above -80 dBm, resulting in loss of PVT. 
Rx2 gave HMI up to 40 m for a few seconds as soon the 0.1 mW at 5 m jammer 
started emitting. It also gave PVT with errors from 2.5 to 7.5 m during the 1 mW 
jammer at 30 m (-80 dBm), contrary to Rx1 who lost PVT at all. 
 
 
Graphic 19 -Planimetric error of receiver 2 over time when 0.1 mW at (5, 15 and 30 m) and 1 mW at (5, 15 and 30 m) 
2 MHz BB noise is applied 
 
0.001 mW and 0.01 mW with 20 MHz noise didn’t have any impact on 
receivers at any distance.  
Rx1 lost position with a 0.1 mW and 1 mW 20 MHz broadband noise when the 
power level was above -70 dBm. The effect on receiver 2 of this type of jamming was 
almost null, just some minor errors bellow 2.5 m. 
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Graphic 20 - Planimetric error of receiver 2 over time when 0.1 mW at (5, 15 and 30 m) and 1 mW at (5, 15 and 30 
m) 20 MHz BB noise is applied 
 
These trials were quite important since they simulated signal powers of cheap 
PPD’s proving how effective they can be at short range. Both receivers seem to be 
affected and not outputting position at around -75 dBm with CW noise, making it 
possible to calculate the jammer action radius (with perfect propagation conditions) 
from PPD’s with different powers using the equations used in the topic 6.1.2.3.2.: 
• 1 mW = ~85 m   
• 10 mW = ~270 m 
• 50 mW = ~600 m 
• 100 mW - ~850 m 
• 250 mW - ~1350 m 
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5.2. SPOOFING 
 
5.2.1. TRIALS 
 
Spoofing tests were performed though the support was aimed on visualization 
capabilities. Moreover, the objective of these initial tests was not to scientifically 
explain and quantify spoofing but only create videos to show that spoofing can be 
done and is a real threat.  
Spoofing tests were successful in every SAC receiver, each one showing 
different behaviour and resistance to spoofing, but in the end they were all spoofed. 
 
5.2.2. EQUIPMENT 
 
The equipment used in these tests is similar to the jamming ones, except that 
an external GNSS antenna plugs into the system according to the following scheme: 
 
 
Figure 24 - Spoofing trials equipment scheme 
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5.2.3. SETUP 
 
In a first phase C/N ratios at the receivers where measured independently, the 
ones that came from the simulator and the ones from the antenna. Since the ratios 
from the antenna were much higher compared to the simulator, the VGA was 
connected to the antenna to attenuate the real signal and approximate both ratios, as 
otherwise the spoofing demonstration wouldn’t be possible since the receiver will 
always track the strongest signal. 
Simulator scenario was created and the settings were quite simple: 6 minutes 
of static position on the antenna coordinates where the last 3 minutes were 
accompanied with high power jamming. After that period, movement starts in east 
direction at slow speed (10 Km/h) for 4 min, stopping a few Km away from SAC 
building. The simulator needs to be uploaded with the latest almanac to match the 
real-world conditions from the antenna. The simulation also needs to be 
approximately (less than 1 s difference) at the same time as the actual time: if not the 
receivers would detect a jump in time and reject the simulated signals. 
The simulated scenario starts with the LNA disconnected, allowing the receiver 
to only acquire real signal for 3 minutes. After this, the LNA is powered, the circuit is 
jammed and the receiver loses position lock. After the jamming period, the receiver 
locks into the simulated signal after a few moments and starts wrongly moving. 
 
5.2.4. RESULTS 
 
Connecting the receiver to ArcGIS (http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis) made 
possible the live visualization of the output of the receiver and affirm that it has been 
spoofed since it has moved away from the SAC premises. Depending on the 
receiver, the tracking of the fake signal could take longer, from 30 seconds until a 
few minutes. If the simulation was stopped the receiver would lock immediately to the 
real signal and plot its position on top of the SAC building, where the GNSS antenna 
is. 
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Figure 25 - GNSS receiver outputting position with spoofed signal 
 
The same trials were done with an Android smartphone and spoofing was also 
a success, taking less than 10 seconds to lock on to the fake signal once the 
jamming had finished. 
 
 
Figure 26 - Android smartphone outputting position with spoofed signal 
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These trials represent a great success on achieving spoofing in lab 
environment, though spoofing in real world conditions require other methodologies. 
In a live situation is not possible to attenuate the signal that is received in an 
independent antenna, so the output power from the fake signal needs to be very 
strong to overtake the real one. Even though these tests were performed, SAC is not 
developing spoofing mechanisms, they were only made for research purposes. 
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ROBUST GNSS 
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6. ROBUST GNSS 
 
As seen in the previous chapter, GNSS have a series of vulnerabilities that can 
impact negatively equipment that rely on the system. Even if most of them aren’t a 
common threat, deliberate interference is for sure an enemy to every application. 
Some of the next solutions can help on mitigating the effects of jamming or spoofing, 
though some of them can also be, and certainly will as piracy evolves, a target for 
future and more developed jammers.  
In a best case scenario, receivers and antennas should have the latest defence 
mechanisms, identifying jamming or spoofing and avoiding it, distinguishing the real 
from the fake signals. Even though a lot of research has been focusing on this 
problem, there is no completely effective solution yet. It’s necessary to create 
jamming detector sensors network and analyse the signals and its effects. SAC is 
currently working on this, in order to provide this information to receiver 
manufactures so they can better understand the threat and make their equipment 
more robust. Combining sensors, new technologies and new systems, can be a 
solution to use as backup plan in case of GNSS failure, providing efficient solutions 
while the outage happens. 
 
6.1. MULTI-FREQUENCY 
 
Multi-frequency receivers give more accurate PVT, since they correct 
ionospheric delays, giving precision inferior to 1 m rather than a few ones. However, 
that’s not the only advantage. With the expansion of open services in more than just 
one band on almost every constellation, if one band gets jammed, positioning would 
still be possible using another one. 
Nowadays, GPS L1 and GLONASS L1 are the most used bands and jammers, 
especially the cheap ones, tend to focus power on them, denying completely GNSS 
service. When new bands are open, even if a jammer focus on L1 they won’t have 
such negative impact as before. Unfortunately this solution is not 100 % effective, 
since new jammers can cover all other GNSS bands at the same time. 
Spoofing gets also more challenging, since fake signals need to be transmitted 
in more bands at the exactly same time. If a fake signal is only emitted in one band, a 
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smart receiver can compare both bands and detect something is mistaken, denying 
the spoofed signal. 
 
6.2. MULTI-CONSTELLATION 
 
Each GNSS should be able to provide efficient PVT in a standalone mode 
using their own bands and respective signals. When combined with other 
constellations the final solution can get significantly better, rising the number of 
visible satellites, useful in low visibility areas, like forests or urban-canyons.  
Since every constellation has its own independence, jamming a certain system 
won’t influence another one, so, a receiver can keep its normal functioning. This 
feature is also useful in case of a system failure, assuring that PVT will still be 
provided with the efficiency of the system that its connect to.  
Spoofing in these circumstances can be almost impossible, unless all bands for 
all constellations are spoofed, but it’s extremely technical demanding. For example, if 
GPS is spoofed giving fake location, a receiver connected also do GLONASS can 
see that something is wrong since the positions obtained from the different systems 
are different and eliminate the error source. 
 
6.3. ENCRYPTED SERVICES 
 
GPS and GLONASS are primarily military systems created to enhance USA 
and Russian’s army, respectively. Even though they provide open services, high 
accuracy ones are reserved for military purposes or very specific applications 
requiring authentication and special receivers. 
Galileo system will offer services that need authentication and higher precision 
than the OS: PRS and CS. CS will be available to anyone who wants to use the 
service, paying a subscription fee. PRS will be used for government authorities that 
require special levels of security and availability, like police and other blue-light 
teams, coast-guards, customs, etc. To access the service, receivers adapted for that 
purpose need to be used and since the signal is encrypted, spoofing is not a threat to 
them.  
94   FCUP 
GNSS Vulnerabilities & Robustness 
 
 
‘We’ve heard about the capacity of PRS to improve resilience in the civil 
environment. But the thread of course is evolving all the time – it’s not just about the 
jamming any more – spoofing is the new game in town’ 
by Dr. Chaz Dixon in Navigationews Magazine (May/June 2014) 
 
Using authentication services is a great advantage against spoofing however 
they are still vulnerable to jamming since this services sits on normal GNSS bands. 
 
6.4. ELORAN 
 
eLoran system has been, in the last few years, considered a system that can 
substitute GNSS in many non-demanding applications. A lot of discussion happened 
around this topic, though the best solutions is probably combine the best of both 
systems and provide a high robust solution. 
Enhanced Loran is the newest technology on LOng-RANge navigation 
(LORAN), with the same principles as GNSS, though instead of satellites it has 
ground signal transmission stations that emit shaped radio signals at 100 kHz. 
Recent studies and trials achieved 5 meter-accuracy, enough for a lot of applications. 
Since the stations are ground-based the maintenance of the equipment is much 
cheaper than GNSS, but lacks one big thing: global coverage is not guaranteed since 
a lot of stations need to be placed on Earth, so it may just be useful in specific areas 
where maybe GNSS signals can be blocked. (Elorantechnologies.com, 2014) 
Using eLoran as a stand-alone technology is not the perfect option, but in 
applications where availability is a need, a combine GNSS + eLoran receiver can be 
a solution in case of failure of one of them, since it would keep a PVT. As an 
independent solution to substitute GNSS is not viable and spoofing or jamming are 
also a threat to eLoran since they still transmit known radio signals, but at different 
frequencies.  
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6.5. IMU 
 
Inertial Measurements Units (IMU) are electronic devices that measure and 
report angular velocities and linear accelerations, giving position information. If 
combined with a GNSS unit, it can be a solid and robust solution. 
In a joined unit, GNSS provides position details and the IMU uses those 
coordinates to estimate the next positions using the parameters they measure with 
great precision. If worked independently an IMU can accumulate big errors after a 
certain period, it is then really necessary to synchronize the position with GNSS 
regularly. So, if GNSS service stops temporarily and for a short period, an IMU can 
still give precise positioning. 
Since an IMU doesn’t use any radio frequency it’s robust against jamming or 
spoofing.  
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FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Global navigation satellites systems are part of an exciting world, never 
stopping and always with new technologies coming up to improve the quality of the 
system. A general knowledge of the constellations available was learnt during 
academic formation, but working with them, knowing their particularities like orbits, 
signals and even history was a great asset. Even the previous contact with Galileo 
was quite sparse, however this has changed since it rouse interest about the future 
of this system and will to accompany the developments of it, defending its 
importance as a European citizen. 
The implementation of the GNSS technologies in the United Kingdom is 
impressive, using them in a wide range of different applications, acknowledging the 
benefits they brought to UK and can bring to PT. With so many areas of 
implementation, especially in vital ones, GNSS seems to be the perfect system 
without any vulnerability. Is a wonderful system, indeed, but can be impacted easily 
by outside agents, especially deliberate interference. The lack of knowledge and 
complete trust in the system becomes then a scary scenario since the common user 
may not prepared for any outage. Is necessary to create backup plans and analyse 
the risks when adopting GNSS solutions. 
It was impressive to see how famous jammers are becoming in the UK, and if 
they ever come to be a problem I now understand how they work and what they can 
achieve. PPD’s can be easily brought in the Internet and it was very important to 
simulate the effects they can have on receivers, even at so low power like 1 mW. 
Even though it’s illegal to use jammers, authorities are not prepared to lead with the 
issue due to lack of information and awareness. Spoofing was completely an 
unknown and consequently an interesting theme of research: the possibility of 
remotely controlling a GNSS enabled machine is exciting but at the same time quite 
dangerous. Jamming and spoofing are gaining their space and any new technology 
is welcome to overtake the effects they can have. 
More lab trials should be performed evaluating the impact of jammer in different 
scenarios. The simulator is highly customizable and can simulate areas of tight sky 
visibility or active high levels of multipath. To validate the work, trials in real world 
conditions should be also done, since jammer signal propagation can vary 
significantly. The results obtained represent the behaviour of two receivers and 
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others can have a completely different comportment, so a battery of tests should be 
planned in order to always test the same scenarios to every receiver. 
After understanding GNSS limitations, is expected that the system can give 
and keep the trust of the users. If something wrong happens to satellites, or even in 
receiver level, the system needs to keep integrity, distinguish what is bad or good 
information and raising alarms when needed, because sometimes is better lack of 
position than hazardous misleading information. GNSS also need to keep availability 
at any point, anywhere. One important factor is the interoperability between systems, 
and for example GPS and Galileo seek partnerships to deliver the best solution to 
users. Moreover, GNSS bands are quite close to each other and new ones are 
coming, so compatibility is more important than ever, assuring that signals from 
determined navigation system don’t affect the proper use of others. To finish is 
important to identify and know technologies that can keep and improve the quality of 
the service even when a vulnerability is presented, ensuring robustness and 
resilience. 
This internship allowed a great contact with the GNSS world in very different 
topics, in a fantastic working environment that permitted to be with people with a lot 
of expertise, sharing new perspectives and own ideas. The scope of this report is not 
close to the actual knowledge acquired during the 6 months period. Using GNSS 
receivers, simulators, RF recorders and players, dealing with different cables and 
connections, different receivers’ software, etc is something that was not done during 
academic formation and was exciting to learn at this level, though previous 
knowledge and preparation is recommended.  
Experiences abroad, in a different country, with another language is 
challenging but at the same time very enriching. As a final personal consideration I 
believe I came a different person, with new life and work perspectives, feeling that I 
did my best to absorb all the knowledge I could possibly take from SAC employees. It 
also improved my responsibility, assiduity, punctuality, team work and confidence, 
hoping that I left SAC better than I found it. 
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CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMPANY 
 
All the work performed seek quality and innovation, never denying a challenge 
and an opportunity to learn, hoping that signs of competence, availability and 
friendship were left on the team’s members. 
The contribute to Satellite Applications Catapult, especially to PNT team, focus 
on the setup and integration of the PNT Lab, making it available and functional to 
SAC customers. This includes, in first place, making a presentable and nice 
environment to work in. All equipment was tested evaluating their capabilities, 
advantages and disadvantages, and in certain cases tutorials were made in order to 
others know how to use them properly. It also includes a full inventory of the assets, 
tagging also the most valuable items. 
Some videos regarding team’s projects and areas of action were done: GNSS 
overview, jamming and spoofing; that can be used in conferences and meetings. GIS 
capabilities were also left, like a concept platform for Performance Quantification 
Network (PQN) network, a jamming detection network, using Ordnance Survey maps 
and services. 
The jamming trials were a great opportunity to evaluate the capabilities and test 
the GNSS simulator, learning how to create tracks, interference level files and 
antenna patterns files, and use the simulation platform. 
The support to other teams was also important, providing GNSS testing 
capabilities to SAC members that lack that knowledge, permitting their projects to be 
developed. 
Finally, SAC received one of 50 certificates to certify that a Galileo fix was 
obtained, doing all the lab work, from configuring receiver, planning observation 
times and analysing data. 
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SATELLITE APPLICATIONS CATAPULT 
 
PRESENTATION 
 
The United Kingdom has always been a worldwide leader on innovation and 
technology. For this main reason, UK’s Technology Strategy Board created a 
network of centres of excellence to enhance his capabilities and provide support to 
UK industry, baptized as Catapult. 
Catapult intends to stimulate innovation, accelerate growth and be a high value 
development activity in the country. They are a group of private companies, funded 
by a core grant from the government, which customers can come from many areas of 
life and businesses: they can be individuals, university spinout companies, 
established SME’s (Small and Medium Enterprises) or even large industries that 
want to expand and invest in new and innovative areas.  
Catapult centres aim to have state-of-the-art facilities and equipment, joined 
with entrepreneur people that have experience, knowledge and are up to date on the 
latest trends of technology. All together they seek to help customers to develop their 
businesses, even from a scratch stage. Business come to the Catapults to benefit 
from their expertise and from the access they provide to world class facilities and 
tools at a limited cost, which is a great feature if you are a start-up, allowing to 
develop and idea rapidly and effectively. 
In Autumn 2010, United Kingdom’s Government announced an investment of 
more than £ 200 million, to create, establish and develop this network. Therefore, 
studies, analyses and decisions were made about the core areas to focus and where 
to engage them. Finally, the chosen areas of technology were: 
• High Value Manufacturing; 
• Cell Therapy; 
• Offshore Renewable Energy; 
• Satellite Applications; 
• Connected Digital Economy; 
• Future Cities; 
• Transport System; 
• Diagnostics to Stratified Medicine (to be established); 
• Energy Systems (to be established). 
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In 2013, the global space economy was worth £ 150 billion and it’s expected to 
grow to £ 400 billion by 2030. United Kingdom wants to be one of the leading 
countries on this business, having a target of delivering 10 % of the global space 
economy by 2030, representing approximately £ 40 billion per year and creating 100 
000 new job opportunities. The challenge is quite demanding and to fulfil it UK needs 
to grow its space technology exports and services from the current £ 2 billion to 
almost £ 25 billion per year. It’s going to be a tough challenge, requiring changing the 
vision of entrepreneurs and showing to the public the power of satellites and satellite 
based applications and how they can improve your daily life. To fill this gap and 
accelerate the market, Satellite Applications Catapult was established in May 2013.  
The launch of the first satellite Sputnik, on 1957, was an enormous 
breakthrough on space exploration, allowing an all-new set of applications that 
permitted, significantly, an increase of quality of life, improving the way we see earth, 
how we navigate, how we communicate, etc. For the last 60 years, many new 
satellite based technologies have appeared, but, for the common user, most of this 
technology goes unnoticed, although, almost everyone uses satellite-based data and 
services in their lives.  A few satellite technologies are well known to the public such 
as TV and GPS, but space is often considered secondary, rather than an 
increasingly essential asset.  
It’s in this context that Satellite Applications Catapult wants to act, improving 
existing technologies, creating new ones and delivering innovative, useful and 
exciting applications. To achieve this SAC is divided on three tech areas, based on 
the type of data that satellites can provide: positioning, navigation and timing, earth 
observation, and communications. Talented, skilled and pioneering professionals are 
in charge of delivering this to customers, offering experienced counselling. To be 
effective in their mission they also plan to educate and change perceptions of space 
tech providing workshops and conferences and making them available to everyone, 
partnering with academia and university on an early stage. 
The areas of action of SAC are quite broad. In the last 6 months, they have 
been trying to reach an enormous set of areas that impacts our daily life: improving 
emergency services, using latest technologies so they can be faster, safer and 
effective; monitoring and managing illegal fishing, which has economic and 
environmental impacts; using latest EO data to provide mapping on harsh areas, 
analysing the melting of polar zones or even creating risk maps so authorities know 
how to react in case of emergency, minimizing losses; studying jamming of global 
108   FCUP 
GNSS Vulnerabilities & Robustness 
 
 
satellite navigation systems in order to minimize the impacts of them in GNSS reliant 
activities that go from fleet management, cargo shipping, bank transactions to 
electric power grids. These are just a few examples of SA Catapult’s activities and 
just by these ones we can affirm the importance of satellites! 
Unlike other companies, the success of Satellite Applications Catapult is not 
measured directly by the own economic grown it has, but by the success and impact 
it has on its customers and partners. Its aim is to support, help and launch new 
businesses based on space potential and this is the characteristic that makes it 
unique and a wonderful place to work in. 
 
LOCATION AND FACILITIES 
 
Satellite Applications Catapult is based in the Electron Building at Fermi 
Avenue, Harwell, Didcot, located on the heart of the Oxfordshire, 25 Km from the 
university city of Oxford and approximately 100 Km of UK’s capital, London. It is part 
of a scientific campus where other satellite companies are based, especially the 
European Space Agency, which has a determinant role in some SAC actions, and 
Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, who took part in a great variety of satellite missions 
like the Galileo program. 
 
 
Figure 27 - SAC premises (Source: SAC website) 
 
The Electron Building includes a wide range of facilities that can be rented at 
limited prices, including a broad variety of meeting rooms with screens, 
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videoconference facilities and even video-walls. If research is needed there are two 
labs that include state-of-the-art equipment, from a wide range of technologies and 
purposes, like oscilloscopes, signal generators, satellite terminals, GNSS equipment, 
etc. One of these labs is highly secured in case sensitive work is done. There is also 
a server that people can use to store data, adaptable to customers’ needs and 
applications, and certified by the European Space Agency. Furthermore, includes 
empty office spaces so customers can have their own space to start developing a 
business. The building also has a bar that serves meals, and a kitchen that can be 
used by staff. SAC employees possess excellent desks endowed with two screens, 
which improves productivity, in an open and light office.  
The reference to SAC facilities is quite relevant because it accomplishes one of 
Catapults key features: having world-class facilities. 
 
MISSION AND VISION 
 
Satellite Applications Catapult’s mission is:  
 
"To innovate for a better world, empowered by satellites" 
 
To achieve that, SAC pretends: 
 
"To be a world-leading technology and innovation company, helping 
businesses of all sizes to realise the potential from space. By embracing a 
pioneering, agile, collaborative and entrepreneurial spirit, we create valued 
partnerships to deliver game changing results". 
 
The strategy comprises six elements, describing how it’s intended to deliver the 
ambition described in their vision.  
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Figure 28 - SAC strategy (Source: SAC website) 
 
The first three strategic elements, represented by the red arrows around the 
wheel, relate to the impact they aim to deliver within their target community. The 
second three elements of their strategy, shown by the blue segments at the heart of 
the wheel, concern the foundations they need to build and sustain within the Catapult 
so they can deliver that impact. 
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ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE 
 
Satellite Applications Catapult is organized according to the following chart: 
 
 
Figure 29 - SAC Structure 
 
SAC employs around 80 people divided on the teams stated on the chart 
above, which are responsible for several different projects.  
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WORKING ENVIRONMENT 
 
Besides working structure, all staff is divided randomly in four different houses, 
composed of around 20 people each. The names assigned represent the four moons 
of Jupiter: Ganymede, Io, Europa and Callisto. The main objective of this division is 
to create bonds with people that you are less likely to work with. So, some activities 
are held where you can get to know other SAC workers, like house lunches, team-
building activities, presentations, etc.  
Every year all the staff is invited to gather in a staff-day-out where they can get 
along with people away from working environment. In June 2014 the gathering 
happened in a forest resort where the houses faced each other in order to create an 
idea of an application using satellite data. The meeting also had different activities 
and games, including a dinner and party.  
The firm offers a range of sport competitions between other companies in the 
campus. In terms of food, SAC provides free fruits and biscuits, and also coffee and 
tea. Staff training and development is highly valued, and in some days, “brown bags” 
were organised where all workers were invited to have lunch (food supplied) while 
some space related theme was presented. It’s also very important to refer that if 
some employee has an idea for an innovative satellite application, the company 
supports him, allowing 10% of working time to be spent on that. 
The company philosophy was quite exciting and very different from what’s 
usual in Portugal, providing a healthy, happy and great environment to work in, 
caring about employee’s needs and aspirations.  
 
PNT TEAM 
 
The Position, Navigation and Timing team is responsible for all related subjects 
regarding global navigation and satellite systems, always paying attention to any 
development on other similar technologies. Chaz Dixon is the head of department, 
followed by Steve Hill, Alper Ucar, Pedro Alfaro Sanz and Justin Beasley as project 
manager. Guy Buesnel was also part of the team but left on May 2014. All elements 
come from different backgrounds, making the team more prepared to any challenge 
ahead. Moreover, they were very open-minded, experienced and always available to 
help out if needed, but providing independence on the work performed. Every 
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Tuesday the team gathered in a meeting in order to tell the work developments of 
each colleague. 
The team possessed a wide variety of GNSS equipment and establishing a 
functional lab to perform PNT activities was a priority, not only for the team, but also 
for any customer who wants do to some research. Therefore, equipment tests were 
done in order to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of them.  
PNT Lab facilities was located on the SatComs Lab and included an expansive 
list of GNSS equipment like: 
• Two radio frequency recorders and players; 
• Three high-end GNSS receivers; 
• Two Bluetooth handheld receivers; 
• One transverse electromagnetic cell; 
• Other equipment such as signal generators, splitters and combiners, 
cables, etc.  
Besides this Lab, PNT owned another space where security clearance was 
needed and it was the location for one of the team’s most valuable item: a state-of-
the-art GNSS simulator. 
 
 
Figure 30 - PNT Lab (Source: Pedro Alfaro Sanz) 
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During the internship period, the PNT department developed activities 
concerning the impacts of jamming on GNSS receivers, creating a distributed 
network of sensors to assess types of jamming and study countermeasures to 
minimize the negative effect on the equipment. This network, designated as 
Performance Quantification Network (PQN) was a work in progress. As part of the 
internship, explanatory videos and presentations were made to showcase the project 
to prospective partners and sponsors. Jamming in-house sensors were also being 
developed and spoofing tests in lab conditions were executed. 
SAC wanted to test Galileo satellite system, not only using the available free 
and open services but also the restricted and future commercial products, like the 
Public Regulated Service. The SA Catapult aspires to be the entity responsible of 
testing PRS in the United Kingdom. 
This simple list sums up most the practical work done from February to August 
2014, but a lot of background work was done during that period, like lab organization, 
tagging, support to other departments, etc. As the company was in an embryonic 
stage, a lot of brainstorming, long term planning and bidding was held for future 
projects, envisaging the development of the team and respective areas of action. 
 
Figure 31 - Testing a GNSS antenna (Source: Pedro Alfaro Sanz) 
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 TASKS PERFORMED DURING THE INTERNSHIP 
 
- Setup and Integration of the Navigation Laboratory within the Catapult’s lab facilities: 
o Installation, integration and operation of GNSS Equipment: High End Geodetic 
Receivers (and control software), Commercial Receivers, Antennas, RF Splitters 
& Combiners, Constellation Simulator and RF Recorders & Players; 
o Set-up Lab PC, installing Windows OS and PNT related software to support PNT 
activities; 
o Generated documentation on how to output NMEA messages from Rx and 
how to connect to GIS software for visualization purposes; 
o Generated documentation on how to connect cables to use Averna RF Rec & 
Play; 
o Recognized faulty equipment (LabSat) and contact vendor who fixed it; 
o Obtained GNSS antennas location using online PPP services; 
o Performed calibration of the IONO monitoring station;  
o Created suite of Python scripts that read NMEA output from Rx and provide 
precision information for static and kinematic situations; 
o Produced PNT equipment inventory and organized PNT storage areas; 
 
- Developed PNT visualization capabilities within the Catapult: 
o STK GNSS Constellations visualization; 
o Concept platform visualization for IDMS/PQN with Google Maps API, 
OpenLayers API and OS OpenSpace API; 
o Usage of Ordnance Survey Maps for PNT activities and demos; 
 
- Performed tests regarding GNSS vulnerabilities and robustness: 
o ESMCP  interference demonstration; 
o Reproduction of STAVOG Scenarios to assess the impact of jamming on GNSS 
Rx; 
o Assessed the advantages or disadvantages of multi-frequency and multi-
constellation; 
o Creation of motion files, interference files and antenna patterns for Spirent 
Simulator; 
 
- Additional support to other projects and teams: 
o Support on PPTI trials obtaining DOP values for the field work periods; 
o Support Spoofing Tests, creating tracks and providing GIS analysis; 
o Support to SAC Applications team on advising the design for the Galileo First 
Fix Event platform; 
o Support to SAC Communications team providing PNT test environment; 
 
- Other tasks performed: 
o Galileo tracking, data recording, data analysis and written report to obtain ESA 
Certificate for the first 50 Galileo First Fixes;
 o Performed Chloe’s Half Marathon tracking analysis and produced report; 
o Edited the PNT ESMCP and Spoofing demonstration videos; 
o Exploration of Raspberry Pi capabilities for PNT activities; 
o Attended Esri UK Annual Conference. 
 
118   FCUP 
GNSS Vulnerabilities & Robustness 
 
 
  
FCUP 
GNSS Vulnerabilities & Robustness  
119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXE 3
120   FCUP 
GNSS Vulnerabilities & Robustness 
 
 
GALILEO RELATED WORK 
 
GALILEO POSITION FIX CERTIFICATE 
 
To celebrate the first anniversary of Galileo’s first fix, the European Space 
Agency launched a challenge to individuals or corporations to send their Galileo 
fixes, giving out 50 certificates to the first ones. The requirements were quite simple, 
just needing the entity name, address, details of the receiver, start and end date of 
the fix in UTC and a plot of the coordinates overlaid on a map, like Google Earth. The 
Satellite Application Catapult wanted to demonstrate its support to Galileo and show 
their capabilities, so they accepted the challenge, and proposed it to be performed as 
an internship learning experience. 
The first step was to determine a time window were the 4 satellites were visible 
from the office location, so Agi STK software was used to estimate it and was 
allocated a certain observation time: 2 of April of 2014 from around 08:30 to 09:30. 
The receiver used was a Javad Sigma G3T fully configured to only receive 
Galileo signals, connected to a Galileo compatible antenna mounted on the roff of 
the SAC facilities. On the desired timestamp it recorded raw observation data 
(converted to RINEX format through the use of Javad JPS2RIN software) and NMEA 
messages. 
The RINEX file showed that the receiver tracked three Galileo OS signals: E1 
(L1), E5a and E5b in a total of 3226 observations/seconds. 
NMEA messages were read using a Python (https://www.python.org/) script 
that converted the messages to a useful Excel (http://products.office.com/en-
us/excel) file, usable for data analysis. Then, comparing the coordinates obtained in 
the observations with the precise antenna location (no datum corrections applied), it 
was possible to briefly evaluate the accuracy and precision. Using the outputted 
coordinates and Quantum GIS (Geographic Information Systems) 
(http://www.qgis.org/en/site/), was possible to create a kml file to open in Google 
Earth (https://www.google.com/earth/). Finally a small report with all the data needed 
was created and sent to the European Space Agency (ESA). (annexe 3)  
The following graph is not presented on the final report because the script was 
created after the challenge and is stated here to show the accuracy and precision 
obtained using only 4 Galileo satellites. 
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Graphic 21 - Position Error of Galileo observations 
 
The average HDOP was 4.6, normal for a four-satellite test, though the position 
results obtained were quite satisfactory for this limited observation, confirming 
Galileo quality and actual operation. 
ESA validated the work done, providing a certificate (annexe 4) and 
consequently SA Catapult can affirm that is one of the first 50 entities to have 
achieved a Galileo fix in the world! 
 
GALILEO FIRST FIX EVENT 
 
In the 26th of June of 2014, the Royal Observatory of Greenwich was meant to 
host a Galileo First Fix celebration event and SA Catapult would support it. In a 
combined effort from SAC different teams it was planned to equip a van with a GNSS 
antenna and receiver, getting real time PVT using only Galileo Satellites, while the 
van was moving around London during the event. That vehicle would also be 
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equipped with satellite terminals to send the van’s location data to the Observatory in 
Greenwich, casting it in a special web application created for the event.  
On the 27th of May, Galileo satellite FM4 suffered from a malfunction and was 
declared unavailable, making it impossible to perform the planned event. The 
following figures show the sketches of the web application that was being developed 
through a collaboration between the SAC PNT and Apps teams: 
 
 
Figure 32 - Galileo First Fix Event platform sketch 1 
 
 
Figure 33 - Galileo First Fix Event platform sketch 2 
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DATA COLLECTION 
 
SAC was planning on performing some Galileo fieldwork in June 2014, 
including the recording of OS and PRS data in a kinematic study. Because of the 
limited availability and coverage of the 4 operational Galileo satellites, observation 
times had to be planned carefully, taking in account the best sky visibility, DOP and 
tracks. In order to support this activity, the DOP values were calculated from the 
satellite’s predicted position (azimuth and elevation) data as extracted from Agi STK. 
Unfortunately, the planned fieldwork could not be finally performed, due to the 
Galileo FM4 malfunction in late May. 
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 SA-Catapult Galileo Fix Report – Page 1/5 
 
 
SA-Catapult Galileo Fix Report 
 
Details 
Name: Catapult Satellite Applications 
Address: Electron Building, Fermi Avenue, Harwell Oxford,  
                 Didcot, Oxfordshire, OX11 0QR, United Kingdom 
Start: 2 April 2014 08:36:35.80 
End: 2 April 2014 09:26:55.00 
Receiver: Javad Sigma 
 
Using a Javad Sigma receiver we successfully achieved position fix using only Galileo 
satellites. With the required software, Javad Netview, we were able to output NMEA 
messages and plot the information on Google Earth. We also recorded receiver’s 
measurements, and we have attached to this document an RINEX 3.01 observation file and 
also the NMEA log. 
 
Location 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Satellite Applications Catapult location in the United Kingdom 
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Figure 2 - Satellite Applications Catapult location in Harwell Campus 
 
Figure 3 - Antenna location 
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Receiver details 
 
Figure 4 - Javad Sigma Datasheet 
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Results 
 
 
Figure 5 - Tracked Satellites 
 
Figure 6 – Skyplot 
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Figure 7 - Galileo Position Fix 
 
Comparing with our precise antenna coordinates we have achieved this results: 
RMS Error 
(m) 
Latitude Longitude Height (ellipsoid) 
3.234 1.865 
2.348 
3.734 
 
The average HDOP was 4.6. 
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The European Space Agency wishes to thank
Satellite Applications Catapult
Positioning, Navigation 	 Timing
Electron %uilding, Fermi Avenue,
+arwell Oxford, Didcot,
Oxfordshire, U.
for the successful Galileo position fix made
on 2nd April 2014 from 0:3 to 0:2 UTC
 in +arwell, Oxford
Lat: 51? 34Ũ  N
Lon: 1? 1Ũ  :
Alt: 10.45m
This award is granted to the first 50 users of the Galileo system.
Didier Faivre
Director of the Galileo Programme 
and navigation-related activities
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 Effects of Interference on a GNSS Receiver 
 
Scope 
The main goal of this project is to evaluate the effect and impact of interference on diverse 
GNSS receivers and to develop the Catapult’s capabilities in this area. 
This project will be carried out in May - July 2014. 
Introduction 
This project will be held under Position Navigation and Timing team activities. The main goal 
is to evaluate the effect of interference on a GNSS receiver’s output in order to achieve the following 
objectives: 
x Test how GNSS receivers react to interference; 
x Evaluate Catapult’s equipment; 
x Test equipment in real environments to validate the simulations; 
x Create scenarios for future testing of receivers. 
So, we will try to answer some of this questions using the adequate equipment and 
methodology: 
x How does interference affect receivers output? 
x What’s the difference between a low-cost and a high-end receiver? 
x Do all receivers behave the same? 
x How does a receiver behave in real-world experiments and in lab? 
x How does a jammer impact receiver’s behaviour in real-world conditions and in lab? 
x Which kind of receiver should we use in different transport applications? 
As part of this project, it is also hoped to achieve a better understanding of the capabilities 
and limitations of the Catapult’s PNT lab equipment. 
 
  
 Work Plan 
The work will be held in different phases in order to achieve the goals step-by-step: 
Phase 1 – Theoretical analysis 
x Theory analysis and acknowledge of concepts related to area of action including brainstorms; 
x Literature review; 
x Learn how to use equipment and recognise capabilities and limitations (receivers, antennas, 
jammers, RF recorders and players, simulator, etc); 
x Planning and preparation of Phase 2. 
Phase 2 – Tool development 
x Record test data; 
x Create scripts to process data (Python programming language); 
x Planning and preparation of Phase 3. 
Phase 3 – Characterization of receivers in real-world  
x Record real-track data; 
x In lab testing; 
x Improve scripts for specific needs; 
x First results and analysis; 
x Planning and preparation of Phase 4. 
Phase 4 – Jamming test in lab 
x In lab jamming tests; 
x Improve scripts for specific needs (if needed); 
x Results and analysis; 
x Planning and preparation of Phase 5. 
Phase 5 – Real world testing 
x (constraint) – this phase requires that permission is granted; 
x Real-world conditions jamming tests; 
x Improve scripts for specific needs (if needed); 
x Results and analysis; 
x Report of work done and respective achievements. 
The following page contains an initial schedule estimation. It must be noted that it might slip 
due to delays, bureaucracies, lack of availability of equipment or other reason.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Work Plan. 
 
 Methodology 
The first steps of the project will be performed through reading and acknowledging the 
concepts needed to realise this test, including getting the know-how about using all the equipment. 
Then, some data will be collected in lab and scripts will be built according to our needs. After this 
important step, real-world data recording should be done. The track should represent a real 
environment, and it should contain: 
x Open spaces (full sky visibility); 
x Urban canyons (lower sky visibility); 
x Different speeds; 
x Roundabouts; 
x Turns; 
x Straight lines. 
In the next figure an installation on a vehicle is proposed to record data in real-world 
conditions. Rx1 (high-end) and Rx2 (low-cost) are the chosen receivers because both work at a 10 Hz 
update rate. Only GPS signal will be used on this project, except real-world tests with Rx2 because it’s 
impossible to turn off GLONASS and SBAS tracking in the receiver. 
 
Figure 2 – Trials Vehicle Test Setup. 
With this installation we are able to record simultaneously the following data: 
x GPS Signal in Radio Frequency Recorder and Player 1 (RF_Rec&Player1); 
x GPS Signal in Radio Frequency Recorder and Player 2 (RF_Rec&Player2); 
x Track data produced by receiver 1 (Rx1); 
x Track data produced by receiver 2 (Rx2). 
In lab, with the data recorded, we can test receiver’s behaviour applying the same signal twice 
(or more) for each signal recorded and comparing them.  
  
Figure 3 - Lab setup without interference. 
Then, we can evaluate the differences between the multiple tracks: 
TRACK COMPARISON OBJECTIVE 
Real Track from Rx1 vs. Real Track from Rx2 Know the difference between receivers output 
Track from Rx1 with 
RF_Rec&Player1 
vs. Real Track from Rx1 
Compare Rx1 output on real-
world tests against Sigma 
with RF_Rec&Player1 signal 
Track from Rx1 with 
RF_Rec&Player2 
vs. Real Track from Rx1 
Compare Rx1 output on real-
world tests against Sigma 
with RF_Rec&Player2 signal 
Track from Rx2 with 
RF_Rec&Player1 
vs. Real Track from Rx2 
Compare Rx1 output on real-
world tests against Sigma 
with RF_Rec&Player1 signal 
Track from Rx2 with 
RF_Rec&Player2 
vs. Real Track from Rx2 
Compare Rx1 output on real-
world tests against Sigma 
with RF_Rec&Player2 signal 
Track from Rx1 with 
RF_Rec&Player1 
vs. 
Track from Rx1 with 
RF_Rec&Player2 
Compare Rx1 output with 
RF_Rec&Player1 signal and 
with RF_Rec&Player2 
Track from Rx2 with 
RF_Rec&Player1 
Vs. 
Track from Rx2 with 
RF_Rec&Player2 
Compare Rx2 output with 
RF_Rec&Player1 signal and 
with RF_Rec&Player2 
 
Output information from the receivers can be obtained using the output NMEA message and 
we can study differences in position (latitude, longitude, height) using GGA/RMC messages, satellites 
in view and SNR using GSV and PDOP/HDOP/VDOP using GSA. 
 
Once these tests are performed, in order to know signal recorder & player equipment and 
receiver’s behaviour, we can introduce jamming on the system using a GNSS Simulator.  
GPS Signal 
  In the GNSS simulator we can create a scenario of a moving vehicle using the NMEA message 
obtained by the real-world data acquisition. In this equipment it’s also possible to apply fixed jammers, 
in a given position and apply different types of interference and respective power. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Lab setup with interference. 
 
Different types of jamming, at different powers in different positions should be simulated in 
order to evaluate the effect on receiver, like: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the roundabout the receiver experiences the same power of jamming as it moves in circles. 
In a straight line the jamming power gradually increases and after passing the jammer it decreases. If 
a turn is made, the car experiences variations of jamming power, increasing when it gets to the jammer 
radius, then decreasing and, after doing the turn, the interference increases again, after passing the 
jammer it will decrease as in a straight line. 
Simulated jammers should be similar to common ones, available on the market, in order to 
verify the true impact of them in real-world scenarios. 
Using the appropriate scripts, created for this purpose, final results will be achieved. We will 
try to perform real tests if we get permission/access to specific testing sites in the UK to validate the 
results that we may get in the lab tests. 
GPS Signal + Interference 
Figure 5 - Jamming power in different types of path. 
  
 
Equipment 
9 Receiver 1; 
9 Receiver 2; 
9 Radio Frequency Recorder and Player 1; 
9 Radio Frequency Recorder and Player 2; 
9 TEM CELL; 
9 GNSS Antenna; 
9 GNSS Simulator; 
9 Signal splitter; 
9 Laptop; 
9 Bluetooth Dongle; 
9 Required Cables; 
8 Car; 
8 Power supply on the car; 
 
 
